

AD-A159 774

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



THESIS

TRANSPORTATION AS AN ELEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA OR THE TIES THAT BIND

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June 1985

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A159 774	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Transportation as an Element of Foreign Policy in Southern Africa or The Ties That Bind		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis June 1985
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Karl Edward Prinslow		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		12. REPORT DATE June 1985
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 175
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Southern Africa Transport International Relations, South African Railway South Africa Railroads SADCC South African Transport Zimbabwe Mozambique CONSAS Services (SATS). Transportation Foreign Policy SAR&H		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This thesis examines the use of transportation as a foreign policy instrument in Southern Africa. Because of its dominant position in the regional transportation network, The Republic of South Africa is the focus of this study. Transportation has been used by the states of Southern Africa as a means of gaining an advantage or leverage over their neighbors to further their own vital interests, economic and political. During the 1970's the South African Railways attempted to use common interests in the creation and maintenance of effective transport organizations to transcend regional political differences.		

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Transportation as an Element of Foreign Policy in Southern Africa
or
The Ties That Bind

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1985

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Accession For	
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DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Availability Codes	
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A1	

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the use of transportation as a foreign policy instrument in Southern Africa. Because of its dominant position in the regional transportation network, the Republic of South Africa is the focus of this study. Transportation has been used by the states of Southern Africa as a means of gaining an advantage or leverage over their neighbors to further their own vital interests, economic and political. During the 1970's the South African Railways attempted to use common interests in the creation and maintenance of effective transport organizations to transcend regional political differences and improve interstate relations. This strategy came to be referred to as transport diplomacy. After tracing the evolution of the Southern African transport network and South African foreign policy, this study examines several attempts to use transport to achieve influence over neighboring states in various ways. A framework that distinguishes between positive, negative and neutral influence strategies is developed; and an effort is made to identify the prerequisites for effective implementation of each type of strategy. Finally, an argument is made that a distinct association of regional transport organizations has come into being in Southern Africa.

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I. REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the colonial period, transportation networks, especially the railroad system, have been used by political leaders in Southern Africa to push regional development in a direction that would benefit the particular personal or corporate interests of a wide variety of individuals, companies and nations. [Ref. 1] Even though the age of empire building is past, transportation remains an integral element of national development and a potential vulnerability for many developing states. For these reasons, transportation ties are particularly susceptible to manipulation by governments seeking to influence conditions and policies in neighboring states.

This thesis will examine the use of transportation as a foreign policy instrument by Southern African states. Particular attention will be paid to developments during the period 1960-1985, especially the emergence of the strategy of 'transport diplomacy' as practiced by the South African Railway and Harbour Administration (SAR&H) during the 1970's and early 1980's. Chapter One reviews the history of rail transportation in Southern Africa in order to provide the

historical context in which politics and transportation have worked side-by-side. To prepare the ground for the assessment of transport's role in regional politics during the 1970's, Chapter Two provides an overview of South African foreign policy which pays particular attention to the importance of technical and economic cooperation. Chapter Three outlines the development of 'transport diplomacy' and the role SAR&H has played in the implementation of South African foreign policy; and it outlines the involvement of the South African transport bureaucracy in foreign policy formulation. Finally Chapter Four attempts to develop a theoretical framework which can be used to analyze the use of transportation as an element of foreign policy and to provide some suggestive comments on the existence of an association of transport organizations in Southern Africa.

For the purpose of this paper Southern Africa is considered to include Zaire, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa (to include its so called independent homelands). Due to the difficulty of gaining access to Angola and an inability to speak or read Portuguese this country's role has not been closely examined except in the historical context and in so far as it has aided Zambia's quest for outlets to the sea. Malawi has

been dealt with in a similar manner.¹ This is because of its lack of direct involvement with South Africa's transport system.

Except for Chapter One, this study concentrates on rail transportation and all usage of the words "transport" or "transportation" can be taken to mean rail transport. The rationale for this is the fact that, measured in volume and value, the railways have been the principal means of interstate commerce in Southern Africa, and railways make up the largest portion of each of the state transportation organizations. At the same time it is important to acknowledge that road transport as a means of carrying on interstate trade, has been growing in importance in recent years.

B. THE EARLY YEARS, TO THE GOLD FIELDS

Until the mid-1800's geography confined most European settlers in Southern Africa to the low lying and fertile coastal regions. The principle obstacles to inland movement were the escarpment, the deserts and the lack of navigable rivers. As late as the 1860's the ox cart and mule drawn passenger coach service were still the principle means of transport. This was a slow and expensive proposition that

¹In the opinion of the traffic planner for Malawi's state trucking company this is a grave mistake, for Malawi is on the verge of becoming the linchpin in the Southern African regional transportation network.

was victim to the capriciousness of weather and disease. For efficient transportation Africa had to wait for the mechanization of transportation, railways, and sufficient surplus capital to acquire them. [Ref. 2: p. 4]

The first efforts to raise the capital necessary for railway construction in South Africa began in London in the late 1840's. Settlers in the colonies were strongly opposed to railways because of concerns about the effects on the livelihood of transport riders and horse breeders as well as a fear of heavy taxes. Their opposition failed to stop the efforts of the overseas financiers; and when the colonial government agreed to guarantee the interest on capital plans were set in motion. Guarantees provided by the British government established an early precedent for state involvement in the railway development in Southern Africa.

The first railway in Southern Africa was designed to speed the movement of agricultural goods from the wine growing district of Wellington to Cape Town. This 63 mile line was completed in 1863. Minor additions were made in the ensuing ten years. Although begun later than the Cape Colony line, the Natal Railway Company completed the first rail line in Southern Africa, a two mile line from the Point (site of ship's dock) to the Durban market on 21 June 1860. Within three years the line was in financial trouble. It was saved by becoming a public institution. This line was extended three and a half miles more to Umgeni by 1867. In

1875 the Natal government purchased this line for extension inland to the sugar producing areas.


Meanwhile, the other ports of the Cape Colony, Port Elizabeth and East London, demanded similar transport facilities. The Cape government determined this to be too difficult due to terrain and the railway's inability to compete effectively with existing ox cart services in these areas. The opening of the Kimberley diamond fields in 1870 changed this situation, for these ports were now the natural ports for freight going to the diamond fields. The new traffic justified a rail line to the 'fields' and the Cape government, now the outright owner of the Cape-Wellington line, seeking to satisfy all constituencies, authorized the building of rail lines from all three ports.

As part of the debate about extending the rail lines, the question of routing and rail gauges surfaced. In an effort to reduce the initial costs of a rail line a 3'6" gauge was chosen. Since the 1870's it has been the standard gauge in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Progress toward Kimberley went forward slowly until the rail lines had been carried over the escarpment, thereafter it made rapid progress. By 1883 the eastern Cape lines had reached the independent Orange Free State and were halted pending resolution of a right of way through the Free State.

In the Orange Free State and the Transvaal the railways were opposed on the grounds that railways were;

- Anti-railway conferences were held in the Transvaal as late as 1887. [Ref. 3: p. 7]



Source: [Ref. 3: p. 86]

Figure 1.1 Gradient Profile of Durban Rail Line.

Discovery of gold in 1884 and the opening of the Witwatersrand goldfields in 1885 caused a redirection northward of all rail lines emanating from the coast. Lourenco-Marques (now Maputo) was the closest port to the Rand and Durban was second with the advantage of size and a rail line already in place. The Cape ports were progressively farther away and more expensive. The Orange Free State sat astride the most direct routes, "Immediately political considerations assumed a dominant role in railway policy." [Ref. 4: p. 479] More specifically a desire for a share of the coastal colonies' customs revenues prompted the Free State, which was unable to raise sufficient revenue independently due to its agriculturally based economy, to form a Customs Union with the Cape and Natal in exchange for rights of way.

The Transvaal had originally sought a united front with the other Afrikaner republic, the Orange Free State. However, President Brand of the Free State feared cutting himself off from the established structure of the coast colonies and a share of its port and rail revenues. The South African Republic (the Transvaal) was anxious to have an independent outlet to the sea and had hoped to annex the area of St. Lucia on the north Natal coast. However, the Convention of London, ending the 1880-81 Anglo-Boer war, restricted the Transvaal's action and prevented it from pursuing this idea further.

The era 1885-1895 and the competition for rail access to the Transvaal provides a classic example of governments' use of transportation to gain political advantage over its neighbors. In this instance, political advantage equated to the decisive economic need of having railroad freight rates pay for the railroad construction costs.

Following Kruger's election in 1883, negotiations with the Portuguese commenced for access to Lourenco-Marques. This is because the Transvaal was still seeking freedom of dependence on British controlled ports. Seeking greater traffic revenue for their colony, the Portuguese gladly signed a protocol providing for cooperation between the two states in the building of a railway to the 'centre of trade' in the Transvaal. [Ref. 5: p. 5] In 1886 the Transvaal again sought financial aid from the Cape in the form of a Customs Union only to be turned down. Their chance to return the rebuff came only weeks later after the Cape realized the true potential for trade to the Witwatersrand gold fields. Later, in 1888 President Brand of the Free State hosted a customs union conference. However, he found only the Transvaal's intransigence to relying on British ports and Natal's reluctance to give up its low rates and favorable position. The Free State and Cape did manage a customs union among themselves and rail lines from the Cape proceeded, reaching the Transvaal in 1892.

For their portion of the rail line, the Portuguese granted the railway concession to an American financed company which rapidly went bankrupt and sold out to an English owned company, owned by Cecil J. Rhodes. Claiming breach of contract, the result of a dispute as to where the border lay, the Portuguese seized the completed rail line from the hapless Delagoa Bay and East African Railway Co., much to the relief of President Kruger who saw British interests surrounding his republic.

The South African Republic granted a concession for building a railroad from Pretoria to the Mozambique border to Het Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorwegmaatschappij (NZASM). On October 24, 1894, after almost four years, a grave toll in human life, and a change in contractors necessary in order to repay old favors, the line was completed. The NZASM ran into such serious financial troubles that the Transvaal government was forced to buy its shares and borrow money from the Cape Colony. This was done under the Sivewright Agreement of 1891, which obligated the NZASM to build a bridge across the Vaal River border and construct a rail line in the Transvaal to connect the Port Elizabeth line with Johannesburg and Pretoria. This line was completed in 1892. It enjoyed a practical monopoly until the line from Lourenco-Marques was completed two years later, thus thwarting Kruger's initial intentions.

Beginning in 1894 with the completion of all lines to the Transvaal, competition for rail traffic became even more acute, and success or failure had a very direct impact on each colonies' financial viability. The Cape, having the longest and most expensive routes, stood to lose the most and sought an apportionment of traffic. The Transvaal refused and maintained control by charging artificially high or low rates on the segments of lines within her territory. In order to direct as much traffic as possible to the Lourenco-Marques line. The Cape lines responded by trans-shipping their loads onto ox carts at the Vaal River border and thus avoid the NZASM's high tariff lines. Kruger's response was to close the Vaal River 'drifts' (fords) on 1 October 1895. This effectively closed the border to the Cape. At a conference in November 1895 Kruger offered the Cape a guaranteed 33% of total goods traffic. The Cape refused given that she was presently carrying almost 80% of the Transvaal's traffic. (See Table I below.)

Shortly thereafter, Kruger, re-opened the drifts under increasing pressure from the British government and domestic unrest caused by hardships in Johannesburg, the result of a lack of supplies and goods coming in over the NZASM line from Lourenco-Marques [Ref. 5: pp. 84-85]. This competition and the natural advantage of the Lourenco-Marques line drastically altered the colonies' revenue projections. Along with feeding inter-state hostility this had the effect of

preventing proper maintenance of existing lines and construction of branch lines.

TABLE I

Percent of Traffic from the Transvaal by Port

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cape and Free State</u>	<u>Natal</u>	<u>Delagoa Bay</u>
1895	79.8%	10%	10.2%
1896	63.7	21.3	15.0
1897*	47.8	26.6	25.6
1903	25.1	44	30.9
1908	12.5	24	63.5
1913**	14.6	34.0	51.4
1918	-----	---	27.9
1921	-----	---	43.9***
1931	-----	---	52.0
1932	11.5	31	57
1934	12	28	60****
1940	9	41	50
1945	15	44	41
1950	16	28	56

* The Orange Free State expropriated the rail lines in 1897 and thus the Cape Colony's share of revenues was even less than reflected here.

**The Mozambique Convention, 1 April 1909, guaranteeing Lourenco-Marques a minimum of 50% of Transvaal traffic, stayed in effect until 1923 but was unable to be followed during WWI due to wartime shipping restrictions.

***The result of tariff changes on the South African Railways. In 1927 Portugal threatened to terminate labor recruitment unless a new convention was agreed upon.

****A new convention requiring a 47 1/2 % minimum of traffic. Lourenco Marques had built new oil storage tanks causing this increase in tonnage.

Sources: [Ref. 6: pp. 712] [Ref. 5: pp. 98-99]

C. CECIL J. RHODES AND THE CAPE TO CAIRO ROUTE

The history of transport in Southern Africa is incomplete without due mention of Cecil J. Rhodes and his legendary dream of a Cape to Cairo route. Rhodes was motivated by a desire to extend the "civilizing" element of the railroad, lay claim to and unite British provinces from the Cape to Cairo, and increase his personal fortune from mineral exploitation. Of greatest importance to the furtherance of rail lines in Southern Africa was Rhodes' political cunning and his ability to secure financing, all in an effort to "extract maximum political advantage with minimum financial outlay." [Ref. 7: p.27] His efforts to build the rail line from Kimberley to Bulawayo exemplify Rhodes' approach.

The first initiative for a line through Bechuanaland (Botswana) came in 1888 from Lord Gifford's Exploring Company. This rivaled Rhodes' plan for a line to the north connecting the Cape with his recently won concession (1888) in Mashonaland (the future Rhodesia). Consequently, Rhodes, a powerful member of the Cape Parliament, supported the bill for a rail line to the Transvaal and obstructed one for connecting lines to Bechuanaland. Meanwhile, Rhodes re-activated old 'friendships' with the Exploring Company representatives in the Cape. This achieved the desired effect of having them recommend to the London Board to join

forces with Rhodes for a Bechuanaland rail line. This they agreed to do, particularly after Rhodes' parliamentary allies effectively denied the Exploring Company's plans for a rail line on their own. Rhodes sought a royal charter company for the administration of lands north of the Transvaal (his recently won Mashonaland concession). Towards this end he proposed forming the British South Africa Company (BSAC or the Charter Company).

Rhodes drew considerable support for his British South Africa Company based on:

1. a rivalry between the Boers, Germans, Portuguese and English over the Zambezi region;
2. the growing clamor for better communications to develop what was to become Rhodesia and;
3. demands for a railway to the north free of Boer or Portuguese influence and interference.

Fortunately for Rhodes, at about this same time (1889/1890) Kruger made it clear to the Orange Free State's President Reitz that he did not want the Cape rail line to go beyond Bloemfontein until his own Delagoa Bay line (to Lourenco-Marques) had progressed further. This made the Bechuanaland rail line the only available option. This fact and his pledge to the British government to spend one half million Pounds on construction earned Rhodes the support of the imperial government which strongly desired a transport and communication through Bechuanaland. Cecil Rhodes' BSAC was granted a charter for the administration of what were to become the Rhodesias.

In order that the BSAC partly relieve itself of the financial pledge it had just made, Rhodes negotiated with the Cape government for the option to buy the rail line from Kimberley to Vryburg, at cost. With this assurance in hand, the Charter Company bought out the Exploring Company's remaining interest in a rail line through Bechuanaland by granting them a 75% share of the profits from the sale of the Chartered Company's 12,000 square mile land grant. Finally in January 1890 agreement between Rhodes, the British government and the Cape government was reached, the terms suited Rhodes well:

He had pledged to spend half a million pounds on building a railway through Bechuanaland, but he did not want to tie up the bulk of the (British South Africa) Company's initial capital on a secondary project such as this. Money was required for the greater work, the opening up of Mashonaland (Rhodesia). The agreements of January 1890 solved this problem...The British government's two 6,000 square mile grants conveniently provided the (BSA) Company with the means to fulfil its obligations. It could use part of the first grant to pay off the Cape for its services; the Exploring Company could be bought out by transferring to it a share in the land; and the capital required for building the Vryburg-Mafeking line could be raised partly on the strength of these grants... 'Mr. Rhodes has, I think, made a very clever political-financial arrangement', commented Herbert at the Colonial Office. [Ref. 8: pp.19-20]

The Kimberley-Bulawayo railway project displayed a number of Rhodes' and the British South Africa Company's characteristics. Principally these were the ability to finance projects from outside the Company by creation of

'sub-companies', by allied capitalists, land grants and dubious promises of future assets and lastly the colonial government's willingness to accept liability to protect what it perceived as its own vital interests. This episode also exemplifies Rhodes' ability at "playing on the self interests of others and thereby winning them to his side." [Ref. 8: p. 33] He did this by emphasizing the Bechuanaland railway as an agent of Cape expansion. In the long term the railway was seen by the Colonial Office as an instrument for British imperial expansion that would provide a link between the Cape and the Rhodesias. It could help surround the Afrikaner republics (and prevent German-Afrikaner cooperation between South West Africa and the Transvaal) [Ref. 9: p. 42] and serve as an instrument to bring about the federation of Southern Africa.²

Following settlement of Mashonaland (Southern Rhodesia) by the Pioneer Column a less expensive and faster route than ox cart from Vryburg was desired to the interior. To this end Frank Johnson explored a route from Salisbury (now Harare) to Beira on the east coast via the Pungwe River. Financed by Rhodes, Johnson organized a road building expedition which arrived by ship off Beira in April 1891.

²See P.R. Maylam, "The Making of the Kimberley-Bulawayo Railway: A Study in the Operations of the British South Africa Company", in Rhodesian History, vol 8 (1977):13-33., for a most complete summation of the details of the politics and financial arrangements of this episode.

British occupation of Mashonaland had ended Portuguese dreams of a trans-Africa colony and Portugal sought to express its disappointment and unhappiness with the BSAC treatment of Portuguese nationals in Mashonaland by refusing to allow a road right of way through Mozambique. Consequently, the true intent of Johnson's expedition was to provoke an incident with the Portuguese authorities whereby the British government would be forced to act firmly against the Portuguese in defense of the freedom of international waterways and trade.

The Portuguese provided the necessary incident by firing a blank shot when the expedition's ships tried to advance up the Pungwe River estuary. The "Beira incident" provided the necessary catalyst to get the British government to insist, as part of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of June 1891, on recognition of the Pungwe River as an international waterway and provide for the right to build a railway to connect Mashonaland with the east coast. [Ref. 10: pp. 1-3] With these guarantees in hand it was only a matter of time, money and thousands of lives lost to fever before the railroad was built to Umtali, in Mashonaland. It was completed on 4 February 1898.

Native rebellions and a rinderpest plague that destroyed the draft animals hastened the need for better communications and a line to Bulawayo was completed in 1897. When the line to Salisbury had been completed five years

later it already had an outlet to the sea via the port of Beira in Portuguese East Africa.

Still a privately owned line, the Charter Company's railroads needed a high volume of traffic to be profitable and thus followed the mineral finds north to Wankie, Southern Rhodesia (coal) and then reaching Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia (lead and zinc) in 1906. But the expected traffic volume did not materialize and the BSAC found itself again in dire financial straits. Fortunately for all concerned, proof of extensive copper holdings in Katanga, needing only a transport outlet to be feasible, was made public in 1906/1908.

D. CONSOLIDATION OF COLONIES AND TRANSPORTATION

During the Anglo-Boer War, 1898-1902, both sides sought control of the railroads. By maintaining the security of the Cape lines and ports, the British were able to use the railways to greater advantage. The Anglo-Boer war also had the effect of beginning to unite the railways of South Africa under one administration, though not with one purpose.

Railway consolidation was effected under the supervision of an English railwayman, LTCOL E.P.C. Girouard. His principle effort was to combine the railways of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, titling the resultant

organization, Imperial Military Railways. Following the cessation of hostilities in June 1902, this became the Central South African Railways and Girouard remained as commissioner.

The Peace of Vereeniging ended the Anglo-Boer War and allowed the railroad rivalry to begin anew. Heavy traffic, the result of wartime movements had boosted railway revenues and colonies' finances. This had enabled expansion via branch lines into agricultural areas. The Transvaal built lines with the idea of increasing communication into underdeveloped areas. [Ref. 4]

The colonial government's concern for an undisrupted mine labor supply enabled Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) to win a traffic guarantee of a minimum of 50% of Transvaal traffic in exchange for South African mine labor recruiting in Mozambique. The remainder of the traffic was apportioned between the British colonies in a 1904 agreement.

With increasing realization of the importance of railways to development in all states, the need for agreement on technical matters and the increasing difficulty of operating several systems individually, the need for a unified system came to be appreciated, constituting a major factor hastening Union in 1910. [Ref. 4: p. 433]

The South Africa Act creating the Union of South Africa also created the South African Railways and Harbour Administration and established an organization for its

management. The real interests of South Africa (as in all countries of Southern Africa) lay in the most efficient and least expensive development of transport facilities. In an effort to achieve this, article 127 of the South Africa Act established the basis of the financial policy of the railways;

The railways, ports and harbours of the Union shall be administered on business principles; due regard being had to agricultural and industrial development within the Union and promotion, by means of cheap transport, of the settlement of an agricultural and industrial population in the inland portions of all provinces of the Union.... [Ref. 11: pp.315-316]

A lot of this reorganization was done with the idea of freeing the railways from political influence which may effect both matters of domestic and foreign policy. An independent body of men with commercial experience was established to oversee management of the SAR&H. As will be shown in Chapters 2 and 3, however, Southern Africa's railway networks have been unable to avoid political manipulation.

Following Union, and with the exception of World War I's expansion into South West Africa, SAR's main priorities were economically and domestically focused. But expansion was occurring for other reasons elsewhere in the region. For example, in German South West Africa (SWA) (presently Namibia) rail lines were built mainly by the military for primarily strategic reasons.

A desire to link the interior capital, Windhoek, with the coast, Walvis Bay, was brought to fruition in June 1902 when a German Army Railway Brigade finished the line after nearly five years of work. During this period a private concern began a rail line to the mining area of Tsumeb in the north of SWA. This being a better line the state line was connected to it, and the old line allowed to fall into disuse and eventually abandoned.

A combined desire to develop the diamond mining of the south coast and bring the interior city of Keetmanshoop into closer communication and control hastened the building of a rail line by colonial troops from Luderitz to Keetmanshoop during the years 1908 to 1909. Complete communication within the colony was begun a year later when a line was built between Keetmanshoop and Windhoek.

Though designed to help consolidate Germany's hold on her colony, this rail system aided the British and South African forces in their capture of the colony in 1915. After the rapid construction of a rail line from South Africa as part of the military subduing of the German colony, South West Africa was linked to and became part of the South Africa Railways.

E. POLITICAL INTERESTS AND RAILWAY EXPANSION IN CENTRAL AFRICA

In the first decade of the twentieth century the Katanga region was at the political and economic center of national interests in Africa as well as the geographic center. All of the interested European powers (Britain, Belgium, Portugal and Germany) sought to gain the greatest profit from exploitation of the Katangan mines. Though each government generally supported its citizens' efforts at development, support was not forthcoming when it was seen to conflict with national interests. In the final analysis, in the development of Katanga and its transport lines, political considerations superseded economic interests. [Ref. 12: p.132]

An Englishman, Robert Williams, won the concession to develop the Congo's Katangan minerals and formed the Tanganyika Company (TANKS) for this end. Identifying rail transport to the Angolan coast as the least expensive means of transport he sought and received a concession from the Portuguese for a rail line from Lobito to the Angolan eastern frontier. King Leopold, and later the Belgian government, wanted to keep as much of the wealth as possible within the Congo and sought a rail and/or river route to its port at Matadi. It was also believed that this could help develop the Congo's interior. Once the wealth of Katanga was

proven (by 1906) the BSAC became interested in transporting minerals via Rhodesia Railways to Beira for a share in the Katangan mines. Two years later, when it was in a substantially weaker financial position, the Charter Co. agreed to build a line to the Congo border for simple remuneration.

As evidenced by the "secret" 1898 British-German treaty, Germany had its eyes fixed on acquiring parts of Angola and Mozambique in the event that Portugal sought to abandon these colonies. Consequently, Germany saw the Benguela railroad as a potentially valuable future asset.³ Even without acquiring territory in Angola a large share in the railroad would enable Germany to bring pressure on Portugal for concessions in southern Angola and advance its plans to create a transcontinental rail line.

Once work finally began, Williams was plagued by financial difficulties. Progress was further hampered by World War I and multiple changes of government in both Belgium and Portugal. The Portuguese, who had the most to gain from the railroad, were not in a strong diplomatic or financial position and were thus of little real assistance. Once Belgium had its own routes well established

³John Day in "Railways of Southern Africa" says that in 1912 Germany was actively seeking financing to buy the railroad and that during World War I dumps of railroad building material were found along a proposed rail line from Tsumeb, SWA to Angola. [Ref. 13: pp.115-120]

(mid-1920's) and realized that there would be sufficient traffic for all prospective lines, offered to guarantee to finance the Katanga section of line to Elizabethville. [Ref. 12: p. 93]

Ultimately, Williams sought British financial guarantees. The BSAC (the Rhodesias) were opposed to any British guarantees provided for a potential competitor and placed all of their diplomatic and financial strength behind their efforts. Williams found these to be far stronger than his comparatively meagre resources and fallacious claims of British national interests [Ref. 12: p. 93]. The Union of South Africa under General Smuts also opposed the guarantee because the rail line would enable Katangan merchants to bypass Johannesburg when importing goods. Smuts also had desires on making Southern Rhodesia part of the Union and joining the two railway networks and so he wanted to maintain the high revenue traffic on the Rhodesia Railways. Only after Smuts' June 1924 defeat at the polls was this obstacle removed. The new Prime Minister, Hertzog, was less imperialistically inclined. Though the British Colonial Office's position (ie. that of Southern Rhodesia and Rhodesia Railways) remained essentially unchanged, the government's Board of Trade was starting to realize that the Benguela line would be finished regardless of British support and desired that the orders for equipment and materials be handled by British suppliers. "It was only when

opposition to the railway from the Empire (principally Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) was withdrawn that the desire to alleviate unemployment in Britain was allowed to come to the fore," enabling Williams to secure indirect financing from the British government." [Ref. 12: p. 133]

Since 1912 most of Katangan copper has traveled south to Beira. Even when the alternative and less expensive routes opened, the Rhodesia Railways commanded one third of the traffic as a means of ensuring the supply of coal and coke from Wankie. Not until the railway crises and border closures of the 1960's and 1970's were the Benguela and Congo routes utilized to carry their full capacities. Prior to Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) these arrangements were set forth in international agreements that restricted the freight on Lobito line to 20% of the total exported.

The Portuguese also played the game of rail traffic manipulation. Following their take-over of Rhodesia Railways in Mozambique, they initiated the Beira Convention which guaranteed that the Rhodesias would use the Port of Beira to full capacity and not cause a diversion of traffic by discriminatory charges.

⁴See Leroy Vail, "Railway Development and Colonial Underdevelopment: the Nyasaland Case" in The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, pp. 365-391, particularly page 383 for the October 1928 British government memorandum eliciting this exact rationale.

In 1963 Zambia and Southern Rhodesia agreed that if either country were to divert traffic from the Rhodesia Railways system (which they jointly owned since the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953) it must pay compensation to the other [Ref. 14: p. 49]. Unable to afford this additional cost, Zambia's options were effectively stymied, to include the option of road transport which was also restricted from competing with the railroads. Southern Rhodesia took full advantage of its position vis-a-vis Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) receiving most of its profitable traffic from Zambia and using it to move its own produce at a loss. (See Table IV)

F. RAILWAYS AS A ROUTE TO IMPOVERISHMENT

One of the last main line railroads to be built in Southern Africa, the Trans-Zambesia Railway, provides one of the sadest examples of misguided political interests. These interests combined with greed to create a heritage of impoverishment for the Protectorate of Nyasaland (present day Malawi).

At the turn of the century the Shire Highlands of Nyasaland were viewed by the British government as ideally suited for plantation agriculture. The settlers' demand for African labor to work their plantations competed with the existing demand for labor to provide human portage. This created a novel argument to build a railroad in order to

free human porters to work the income producing plantations. Following the Anglo-Boer War (1902) the British Foreign Office permitted construction of a rail line to begin. By World War I a line had been built from Blantyre in the highlands to the Zambezi River.

Following WWI, which effectively removed Germany from Eastern Africa, Britain saw an opportunity to expand her interests in the area by buying controlling interests in the Portuguese chartered companies administering the northern sections of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). Private British companies were chosen to act as agents for the government in order not to provoke Portuguese suspicions. [Ref. 15: p. 369]

One aim of these chartered companies was the development of their territories, and this meant railroads into the interior. Due to a lack of funds the companies sought British guarantees of their debentures. Despite gloomy economic outlooks for the proposed Beira-Zambezi line and the fact that Portugal was already building a competitive line in the vicinity, this idea was seized by the British Colonial Secretary as the means by which to "bolster Britain's economic position in the south... especially as she thought there was an imminent American commercial invasion of the area in the offing." [Ref. 15: p.370] The burden of this financial guarantee fell to the Protectorate of Nyasaland owing to a misunderstanding between the

Colonial Office and the Treasury as to which office would be responsible for the future debt. [Ref. 15: pp. 371-372].

In an effort to reduce this financial obligation, Nyasaland fell into a never ending circle of freight rate policies and improvements designed to increase the railway's efficiency. However, these additional investments only added to the debt burden of the colony which was required to guarantee the investments. The ultimate project in this category was the Zambezi River bridge. It was believed that this bridge would improve railway efficiency and would pay for itself by providing the needed impetus to develop the Moatize coal fields which could be used for fuel and rate paying traffic. By the mid-1920's the impoverishment of Nyasaland was getting to be all too apparent to the settlers and even the Colonial Office. But domestic British interests in the form of unemployment and a failing steel industry carried the day in the push for building the Zambezi bridge. Once again Nyasaland was provided a loan, adding to her already unmanageable debt, with which to fund the bridge project she did not want.

This episode serves as an example of how British strategic and commercial interests dominated/commandeered the policies of the Protectorate of Nyasaland.

To further British interests in the area imperial decisions were taken to protect the British proxy there, the Mozambique Co. This protection included support for the Trans-Zambesia Railway project...this was calculated to protect interests from American commercial

threats...In the late 1920's a second major project was approved...the Zambezi bridge...in order to provide steel orders....The only possible money maker for the bridge and railway system (Moatize coal)...was prevented from being developed lest it compete with Welsh coal. [Ref. 16: p. 112]

G. EXPANSION AND MODERNIZATION

The pre-Anglo-Boer war years demonstrated the disadvantages of rate wars to all of the region's rail lines. In the seven years preceding the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 numerous conferences were held to develop an equitable system to regulate freight rates and traffic. These conferences resulted in a growing consensus for a union of the colonies, expressed in 1907 by the High Commissioner of South Africa, Lord Selbourne:

conflict of railway interest, would vanish like a foul mist before the sun of the South African Federation, would it any longer be in the interests of the Transvaal to lead exclusively to Delagoa Bay (Lourenco-Marques). [Ref. 3: p. 26]

It was further argued in 1908 by the Closer Union Organization in their booklet, "The Government of South Africa", that only the central government shall have the power to manage a private corporation (ie. transportation) that otherwise would be more powerful than the state itself. It therefore should be the government's responsibility to build and administer transportation [Ref. 3: p. 26].

The South Africa Act of 1909, creating the Union of South Africa, sought to end railway competition, declaring that: "...all Ports, Harbours and Railways belonging to the several colonies at the establishment of the Union shall from the date thereof vest in the Governor-General-in-Council." [Ref. 3: p. 13] Thus was formed the South Africa Railways and Harbour Administration (SAR&H).⁵ However, this new organization's responsibility became increasingly clouded and in 1916 a supplementary act was passed which more clearly delineated the chain of responsibility of the SAR&H to the Minister of Transport who was to be advised by the Railways and Harbour Board.

In the pre-Union era inter-colonial rivalry for mineral related traffic was the criteria for railway construction. Following Union other domestic interests began to dominate, primary among them being agricultural interests. During the period 1910-1935, eighty-seven separate acts were passed by Parliament rendering permanent assistance to the farmers. "These acts and the scores of similar acts which followed them made agriculture the favorite and special charge of the state" [Ref. 17: p. 253] It is important to note that the mines provided the bulk of the money for the agricultural schemes, this included paying exorbitant freight rates which

⁵In 1981 the SAR&H changed its name to South African Transport Services (SATS) to more accurately reflect its much broader transport responsibilities.

made it possible to reduce the railway rates for agricultural products and machinery, some of which was carried at a loss or provided free of charge as in the case of moving livestock during times of drought. The growing political importance of the agricultural sector required the government to meet the demand for branch lines to the maize producing areas, uneconomical though they were. The advent of the automobile and truck allowed the railways to shut-down uneconomical rail lines and simultaneously increase motor transport services (begun in 1924) to rural areas, substantially improving market access and production.⁶

In keeping with the theme of this thesis, transport in international relations, the history of the SAR during the years from Union to the 1960's/70's will not be detailed here. However, it is worthwhile to point out that:

1. During this period, interest in transportation was domestically focused and centered principally on the issue of how freight rates were to be determined. A hotly and repeatedly debated issue was the interpretation of the portion of the South Africa Act requiring SAR&H to operate according to business principles.⁷

⁶See Trampitsch, [Ref. 18] especially page 19 for comment and analysis of the negative consequences of new transport routes in undeveloped areas.

⁷See Frankel, Herbert S. and Verburgh for examples of this debate. These two books and their authors led the debates and analysis of the politics and economics involved.

TABLE II

South African Railways Route Mileage

<u>Year</u>	<u>Mileage</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Mileage</u>
1873	57	1915	9,011
1875	144	1920	9,565
1877	404	1925	11,923
1879	849	1931	13,098
1882	1070	1941	13,231
1884	1572	1951	13,501
1886	1821	1956	13,608
1895	2651	1961	13,635
1905	5517	1966	13,728
1910	6991	1984	14,840

Sources: [Ref. 19] and [Ref. 20]

2. By 1925 most mainline railways were in place. Mileage added after that time was principally designed to expand the capacity of congested lines. (See Table II for the progression of route mileage on SAR.)
3. The efficiency of SAR&H improved by quantum leaps because of countless technological improvements and demands placed upon it during the the two World Wars. The most important technological advances included using heavier track, new rail designs, longer welded rails, concrete sleepers (ties), tunnelling, regrading and new bridges. Cargo handling was improved and electrification was begun, allowing for heavier trains, more efficiently running engines and reducing the need to haul coal around for use on smaller branch lines located away from coal bunkers. [Ref. 13: pp. 62-63]
4. Motor transport services of SAR&H assumed an increasingly important role in moving products to the rail lines, enabling the government to resist demands to build unprofitable rail lines.
5. The railway was involved in some interests outside the borders of South Africa in an effort to attract transit traffic. For example, it once led a move to impose extremely unfavourable tariffs on Benguela traffic and was disappointed at Rhodesia's rejection of a rail line through Beit Bridge. [Ref. 7: p. 19]

6. Engineering and transport conferences served to create a limited degree of cooperation and interchange between national railway organizations in Southern Africa. The first such conference was held in Johannesburg in 1936 and then again in 1950. During the 1950's and early 1960's there were six more conferences of the General Managers.

The other national rail networks in the region were also moving through a phase of expansion by building branch lines and incorporating the same technological changes mentioned above. World War II dealt a severe blow to most lines, particularly in the high demands for service and few opportunities or equipment for repairs and maintenance. In the case of Rhodesia Railways the need was so great and the lack of capital so severe that the government of Southern Rhodesia purchased the line in 1949. In the same year the Portuguese government purchased the Beira-Umtali line making all major rail lines in the region state owned. Problems in freight handling resulted in the first major post-war traffic restrictions. This occurred when congestion at the port of Beira became so severe that the Mozambican government was forced to restrict Rhodesian traffic requiring Rhodesia to use South African ports.

The creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in September 1953, broadened the ownership of Rhodesia Railways. More significantly the new broader interests of all three states in the Federation resulted in the building of a rail line from Bulawayo to Lourenco-Marques, giving the Federation access to three ports; Port Elizabeth, Beira and

Lourenco-Marques. A route to Beit Bridge, South Africa was also considered but rejected because too much of the generated revenue would accrue to South Africa. [Ref. 21: p. 1553]

In the field of transport, the period of independence in Southern Africa was characterized by nationalization of transportation as a revenue generating and politically influential asset. The break up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland resulted in Southern Rhodesia receiving the lion's share of the railway assets and facilities. Zambia kept the tariff collection point.

The 1970's were a time of even more modernization and expansion by SAR&H in an effort to meet the growing demand of industry for more efficient transportation. Projects included computerized traffic control and the building of Richard's Bay (a bulk handling terminal to provide an alternative to Maputo) and the Sishen-Saldanha Iron Ore Project. The SAR&H also aided a South African consortium in its effort to build the Mozambican port of Nacala and rail line to Malawi. It also helped Rhodesia build the Beit Bridge link in an ironic reversal of 15 to 70 years earlier when the line was not built in an effort to reduce contact with South Africa.

Outside South Africa the most significant event in the transportation network was the building of the TANZAM railway from Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia to Dar Es Salaam,

Tanzania. This opened in 1975 and was the first major rail line in the region since the Benguela line opened in 1931. More importantly, it provided Zambia with a rail outlet not under the control of a white minority ruled country.*

During this period, economic growth and transport expansion in South Africa interacted with independence struggles and civil wars in the rest of the region to enable the Republic to increase even further its dominant regional position in the field of transportation. This fact is demonstrated in Table III.

TABLE III

Transport Infrastructure in Southern Africa,
South Africa Compared to the Rest

<u>Point of Comparison</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1981</u>
Rail route-kms. per capita	3.9:1	4.2:1
Rail route-kms. per sq km	3.7:1	4.0:1
Rail wagons per capita	13.3:1	13.4:1
Locomotives per capita	10.0:1	10.9:1
Ton-kilometer per capita	10.0:1	12.9:1
Road kms. per capita	3.8:1	2.8:1
Tarred road kms per capita	5.1:1	8.0:1
Roads kms. per sq km	2.7:1	2.7:1

Source: [Ref. 22: pp. 15-19]

*For a very complete story of the history, construction and political ramifications of the TANZAM see Martin Bailey, Freedom Railway, London: Rex Collings, 1976.

Often times more significant than mileage and ton-miles is the access to the sea, ie. ports. In this regard South Africa has the upper hand in that it has seven major ports, to include the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa (Durban) of the 19 in the region. [Ref. 23: pp. 8-9]

TABLE IV

Rhodesia Railways--Estimated Profit or Loss for
Principal Commodities--Year Ending 30 June 1963

Commodity	Profit or Loss Per Ton Pounds	Estimated Product Valuation per Ton Pounds	Product Origin (Country)
Tobacco	+0.48	347	Mostly Rhodesia
Maize and Maize meal	-0.79	15	Mostly Rhodesia
Asbestos	-0.24	42	Rhodesia
Chrome Ore	-1.29	5	Rhodesia
Zambian Copper (full rate) To Beira	+7.49	210	Zambia
To Lourenco-Marques	+6.60	---	Zambia
Zambian Copper (Discount) To Beira	+2.72	---	Zambia
To Lourenco Marques	+2.36	---	Zambia
Copper to South Africa	+9.04	---	Zambia
Lead and Zinc	+0.62	57-58	Zambia
Coal and Coke	-1.52	1	Rhodesia
Livestock	-0.09	13.5	Rhodesia

Source: E.T. Haefele and E.B. Steinberg, "Government Controls on Transport." The Brookings Institute, December 1965 in [Ref. 14: p. 50].

II. HISTORY AND FORMULATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

A. HIGHLIGHTS IN THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter outlines some of the highlights and trends of recent South African foreign policy, with special emphasis on South Africa's use of technical and economic as an instrument of its policy towards the Southern African region. The transportation infrastructure and organization has played an important role in regional foreign relations and details of its role will be covered in section B. Section C will address the role transportation plays in the formulation of foreign policy in South Africa. Prior to 1948 South Africa's foreign relations were closely tied to the policies of the United Kingdom, both substantively and procedurally. During this period, trade, finance and industrial representatives were frequently called on to act as diplomatic representatives abroad.

Following the 1926 Balfour Declaration, which confirmed the independent status of the Union, South Africa created a Department of External Affairs in 1927. The portfolio for this ministry was maintained in the hands of the Prime Minister (first Hertzog and then Smuts and Malan). Dominance by such a forceful personality as General Smuts resulted in

a very personal imprint on foreign policy matters and occasional bypassing of the Department of External Affairs and even overseas diplomats in major policy decisions. [Ref. 24: p. 9]

Smuts foresaw the post-World War II British Commonwealth as a continuation of the Commonwealth of pre-war days and envisaged this organization as a means of extending South African influence in Africa. Smuts suggested that a commission, composed of colonial powers and others with economic and military interests in Africa be established to devise a common policy for Africa. He argued that South Africa ought to be included because of its status as an independent, developed state with a large white population and which had the mandated responsibility for South West Africa. Nothing came of this suggestion, however.

Smuts wanted Africa, and particularly Southern Africa, to be South Africa's sphere of influence, and since the 1920's South Africa has had ambitions to knit together "the parts of Southern Africa that belong to each other, parts that most necessarily work together for a stable future on the continent of Africa." [Ref. 25: p. 20] South Africa's regional foreign policy heritage is thus one of closer regional co-operation, though during World War II and the early postwar years it was assumed that South Africa would work for closer regional co-operation with members of the colonial empires and not as fellow independent states.

Prime Minister Malan, the first National Party Prime Minister (PM), 1948-1954, established a roving ambassador to try and counter the world's growing estrangement with South Africa. However, the Prime Minister maintained the foreign affairs portfolio for himself. While international condemnation of South Africa grew louder, especially from newly independent nations, foreign economic relations were largely unaffected. More importantly, continuing strong economic relations with the West meant that foreign powers had a stake in maintaining a stable South Africa. Trade within Africa continued to grow. However, creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 altered the trade pattern between South Africa and the Rhodesias, the result of the Federation's protective tariffs.

By the mid-1950's South Africa had to face the reality of newly independent African states. Malan saw Africa as South Africa's primary diplomatic front but thought in terms of European powers, of which he counted the Union.

Prime Minister Strydom, 1954-1958, appointed Eric Louw as Minister of External Affairs relieving himself of the portfolio. This action placed foreign affairs in the hands of a man who was not only a close political ally but the foremost expert in the cabinet [Ref. 24: p. 21]. Louw realized that South Africa's future did not lay in identification with the colonial powers and urged that South Africa "accept its future role in Africa as a vocation and

must in all respects play its full part as an African power". He foresaw South Africa as a link between the West and the states of Sub-Sahara Africa. He hoped these African states would realize that apartheid was not a threat to them and that all states could combine to counter external interference. [Ref. 25: p. 106]

In the absence of diplomatic ties with most African countries, both Prime Ministers Strydom and Verwoerd, 1958-1966, emphasized the promotion of technical cooperation between South Africa and African territories, and on South Africa's ability to provide assistance in such fields as agriculture, medicine and communications. This was publicized by Louw in March 1957 when he spoke at the University of Pretoria. He argued that South Africa, by making its scientific and technical assistance available to Black states, would be able to preserve its white identity and establish mutual trust and understanding [Ref. 25: p. 106]. Pretoria saw technical cooperation and the provision of aid as an important channel of communication and as a possible forerunner to the eventual establishment of formal ties [Ref. 24: p.14]. Until the mid-1960's South Africa had contact with the countries and territories of Africa via organizations such as the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) and its auxiliary Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (CSA) and the Inter-African Bureau for Soil Conservation

(BIS). These were disbanded or absorbed by the OAU in the mid-1960's.

This form of inter-action initially transcended independent Black Africa's break of relations with South Africa and would resurface again 20 years later as the only source of contact between otherwise hostile states.

Growing international isolation, highlighted by the Commonwealth's efforts to change the internal politics of South Africa, and a desire to finally free itself from the United Kingdom prompted Prime Minister Verwoerd to leave (some would say be thrown out of) the British Commonwealth of nations. The ultimate break with the Commonwealth on 31 May 1961 also changed the Union of South Africa to a Republic and the Department of External Affairs became the Department of Foreign Affairs. This victory of Afrikaner independence was a symbol of growing withdrawal from old ties. Internally the country was faced with its most serious threat to stability in the form of the Sharpeville riots. Repressive security measures restored order and near draconian economic measures eventually restored domestic and international confidence in the economy. About this time the government also introduced the idea of separate development or 'grand apartheid' as its answer to quell criticism of the lack of political representation of Blacks in South Africa.

Louw served as Foreign Minister until 1966. During the Verwoerd years (1958-September 1966), however, the Prime

Minister dominated foreign policy formulation. This he was able to do due to his high personal standing, leadership and power of persuasion [Ref. 24: pp. 22-23]. Such strong and powerful leadership had the disadvantage of creating an attitude of "leave it to Verwoerd". This was reinforced by a sense of God-chosen leadership among the Nationalist Afrikaners [Ref. 25: p. 131].

During the early 1960's South Africa's foreign policy became largely a response to external attacks. But after the troubles of 1960-61 the economy began to pick-up again and by 1964 Prime Minister Verwoerd was able to tell the House of Assembly that once the maelstrom and chaos of the early years of independence were over, good relations would be established with other African states and, as originally predicted, the foundations of good relations would be built on South Africa's economic and technological strength [Ref. 25: p.167]. Verwoerd established two guiding principles of South African foreign policy:

1. The objective of maintaining the white nation of South Africa.
2. Friendly relations would be sought only within the limits of South Africa's right to its own domestic policies to include the establishment of independent homelands, "a policy which does precisely what those countries of Africa which attack us want for themselves." [Ref. 26]

This scheme and these principles for regional relations formed the basis of South Africa's regional policy in subsequent years. Verwoerd had a strong belief in the

primacy of economic interests over political considerations and was willing to use bilateral aid and economic contacts as a means of breaking through South Africa's political alienation. Verwoerd, through the evolution of the policy of separate development, hoped to create a commonwealth of nations in South Africa. He also sought to draw the High Commission territories (Bechuanaland, Lesotho and Swaziland) into the homelands design. He envisaged a common market together with a consultative political body of free Black and White states in Southern Africa [Ref. 24: p. 25] and [Ref. 25: pp. 173-174].

The ideas of regional economic cooperation in Southern Africa began to receive academic attention and to gain intellectual acceptability in the 1960's. By the late 1960's South Africa was clearly the hub of the new Southern African economy, this was the result of several developments, including the Portugal's decision to open its territories to investments, the independence of the British territories in Southern Africa and South Africa's own flexing of muscle via its outward policy [Ref. 25: p. 246]. Regional trading patterns changed in response to these new realities. In 1968 the South African economists J.A. Lombard, J.J. Stadler and P.J. van der Merwe gave impetus to the idea of systematic cooperation, identifying it as an alternative to isolation or integration. This would produce, they argued, the optimum combination of politics and economics. Greater

inter-regional trade would also reduce the region's dependence on the rest of the world.

The assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd brought BJ Vorster to that position in September 1966. Within a year he embarked on a reorientation of South African thinking about regional relations,⁹ if not a whole new policy itself. This received the label of "outward movement" or "outward policy" and had Africa as its focal point. "The Republic's economic pre-eminence gives her a pre-eminence in all other spheres." [Ref. 25: p. 247] Such thinking in 1967/68 by Foreign Minister Muller led him to tell the students of the University of Stellenbosch that South Africa was now assuming her rightful leadership role in Africa. Pronouncements such as this by Muller and the new Prime Minister Vorster paved the way for the outward movement by making it acceptable to White South African public opinion. The objective was to establish a 'modus vivendi'¹⁰ with the black states. This policy was launched at a time

⁹Adrian Guelke identifies other analyses of the outward movement; (a) South Africa needed markets for her manufactured goods (b) South Africa was looking for domination of the region similar to the United States in Latin America (c) South Africa was seeking an image in the West as a stable and prosperous state enjoying the goodwill of her neighbors. [Ref. 27]

¹⁰The American Heritage Dictionary defines "modus vivendi" as (1) a way of life (2) a temporary agreement between contending parties pending a final settlement; a practical compromise. Also see Barber, "South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970", pages 228-229 for a more Marxist interpretation of South Africa's need to project outwardly.

(1967/1968) of strong white confidence in South Africa's economic power, military strength and its ability to overcome dangers in the future and thus be able to retain control of the state.

Outward movement, also labeled the outward policy, was a broad based attempt by the South African government to improve its international status and position. The objectives of the outward movement included;

1. Establishing a leading role in Africa for South Africa.
2. Ensuring military security in Southern Africa.
3. Building an extensive network of economic contacts.
4. Strengthening South Africa's identification with the west.
5. Preventing external intervention in South Africa's affairs. [Ref. 25: p. 227]

The government did not see this new initiative as an alteration of objectives, but rather as a change of methods and strategy necessitated by changes in the external environment Vorster sought to maintain "the closest economic and technological cooperation among all the countries of the region, for their mutual benefit and joint development."¹¹ [Ref. 26: p. 10] This was aimed at Africa following the wisdom that

¹¹Barber provides a more cynical view; "South Africa sought to increase the security and wealth of the Republic by surrounding her with dependent territories which would put political stability as well as economic and technical cooperation high on their list of priorities." [Ref. 25: p. 243]

for South Africa the key to better worldwide relations was better relations with its neighbors. Vorster became personally involved in regional diplomacy by meeting with Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho in 1967 and a Malawian delegation and Prime Minister Smith of Rhodesia, and making trips to Malawi, Rhodesia and to West Africa to meet the leaders of Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia. The meeting with President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast led to South African Airways landing rights in the Ivory Coast.

However, closer contact with neighboring states (unlike more distant black African states) did not lead to an exchange of diplomats. Foreign Minister Muller in 1968 explained; "That is because it is impossible to communicate directly with those distant countries as we do in the case of our...neighboring states." [Ref. 24: p. 50] Attempts to expand dialogue were curtailed because of opposition by the Organization of African Unity and growing African frustration over the Rhodesian and South West Africa issues.

Though Muller did not refer to transportation connections directly, contacts through trade representatives and inter-organizational relationships (as between the SAR and other railroads) were virtually all that remained for South Africa. By this time, other technical cooperation organizations had been abolished or absorbed into the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Pronouncements such as Foreign Minister Muller's above, opened the doors for the role transportation was to play in foreign policy in the next ten to fifteen years. Dr. Jacobus G.H. Loubser assumed the position of General Manager of the South Africa Railway and Harbour Administration (SAR&H) in 1970, a most opportune time. The economic boom of the 1960's both required and enabled him to expand the SAR&H and the atmosphere within government allowed him to pursue his ideas of "transport diplomacy" as a superb complement to the Prime Minister's new outward movement.

Indications of the relative success of outward movement include the renegotiation of the South African Customs Union (S.A.C.U.) agreement in 1969 making it more favorable for the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS countries).¹² The less than overtly hostile position of the moderate governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi was

¹²The December 1969 S.A.C.U. agreement between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS countries) provided for the levying of uniform customs excise and sales taxes, the free interchange of duty paid goods imported from the outside the common customs area, imposition of additional duties for protective purposes by the BLS countries regulation of the marketing of agricultural produce and revision of former method of calculating the division of customs, excise and sales duty revenues. It also opened Swazi access to the port of Lourenco-Marques (Maputo). [Ref. 1: pp.393-402] For a more detailed analysis of the SACU agreement see pages 86-92 of Shaw Timothy. "Southern Africa: Dependence, Interdependence and Independence in a Regional Subsystem", pp. 81-98 in Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa: Papers on a Regional Subsystem, edited by Shaw, Timothy and Heard, Kenneth A. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977.

also considered by South Africa as a success of outward movement. Through communications with these countries South Africa was able to give effect to its offer of aid and assistance to Black states which along "with trade links the Republic relied on to draw the countries of southern Africa closer together" [Ref. 24: p.38]. This materialized in such ventures as the construction of the Malawian capital (Lilongwe) and infrastructural improvements in the BLS states. Thus South Africa began to use trade, aid and technical assistance in a functionalist strategy which it hoped would result in positive effects in the political realm. [Ref. 26: p. 11].

One of South Africa's main concerns regarding regional cooperation was to maintain the existing political order in Southern Africa, which included maintaining the existing domestic political order in each country (ie. non-interference with each other). Unless the unwritten rule of non-disclosure of foreign policy debates within the government is broken, one will probably never know for sure whether South Africa deliberately sought to make its neighbors dependent on the Republic. What is clear is that South Africa has been principally concerned with the behavior of its neighbors and has sought to influence that behavior.

Unfortunately, for outward movement, South Africa's actions toward Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of

Independence (UDI) were easily interpreted by Black African States as a commitment to support white neighboring governments. Conversely, the late 1960's was seen by South Africa as a time of increased "terrorism" and "communist domination", and Prime Minister Vorster was not willing to tolerate these perceived threats in Southern Africa. He was determined to stop them, even by militarily going beyond South Africa's borders. Efforts at non-aggression pacts with independent black states in 1970 were unsuccessful.

In the early 1970's South Africa sought a resolution to the Rhodesian UDI issue. This was designed to prevent its' damaging South Africa's attempts at outward movement and her general international standing, perhaps even reduce the verbal and diplomatic attacks on South Africa for keeping Rhodesia's lifelines open. The Portuguese coup of April 1974 awakened Kaunda to the opportunities for diplomacy. Concomitantly, in the early 1970's South Africa began to seek a solution to the Rhodesian UDI issue in an effort to prevent further its damaging South Africa's efforts at outward movement and general international standing. The Portuguese coup and the pending independence of Angola and Mozambique catalyzed South African and Zambian willingness^{1 3}

^{1 3}Shaw and Mugomba make a case that the requirement for cheaper means of exporting copper and receiving imports to satisfy the growing consumer market was the true motive for the pragmatism in foreign policy shown by Kaunda. See [Ref. 28]

to discuss regional issues. October 5, 1974 was the dawning of new initiatives closer to home (labeled detente) as leaders of South Africa and Zambia spoke about "peace, progress and development in Southern Africa." [Ref. 28: p. 397] On October 23, 1974 Prime Minister Vorster informed the country that South Africa had come to a crossroads and would have to choose between peace and escalating conflict. Ambassador to the U.N., R.F. "Pik" Botha, informed the world the next day that South Africa was committed to eliminating racial discrimination. With these pronouncements an era of detente began.

Though detente was initially directed at resolving the regional issues of Rhodesian independence and South West Africa there was a wider hope by South Africa that detente would draw Southern Africa together in a strong bloc. This bloc would promote common social and economic interests and would present a united front towards the real enemy, the Soviet Union and their 'agents', militant black nationalists. [Ref. 29: p. 4]

The highwater mark of detente came less than a year later in August 1975 at the Victoria Falls peace talks in which PM Vorster and President Kaunda of Zambia brought Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia together with the Rhodesian rebel leaders. Though not a diplomatic corps per se, the SAR&H played an instrumental role in the mechanics of setting up this conference. During the talks Loubser even

persuaded the Rhodesians to guarantee an open Zambian border for the transit of Zambian trains to South Africa.

The Victoria Falls talks failed to resolve the conflict in Rhodesia. This failed initiative, along with South Africa's intervention in Angola, finished the detente era. The loss of the cordon sanitaire provided by the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, an increase in international ostracism (eg. 1977 U.N. arms sanctions) and increased internal unrest (eg. SOWETO 1976) sealed the fate of detente. Out of this came what Geldenhuys calls a "defensive" strategy (one could also use the term "less optimistic") of the Constellation of States.

Though the term "constellation of states" had been used by Prime Minister Vorster, the Botha government's (1978 to the present) revival and definition of this policy give authorship to his administration.

Shortly after election as Prime Minister, the former Minister of Defense, P.W. Botha, introduced a number of changes to the government. These included relationships within the government as well as the relationship between the government and the private business sector. This latter initiative was fostered by P.W. Botha, culminating in the Carleton Center Conference of November 1979 and the Good Hope Conference in 1981. This new partnership between government and business flowed from the new Prime Minister's emphasis on economic cooperation and development in Southern

Africa. This, in turn, was a key element of his proposed Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS).

P.W. Botha's constellation was conceived as part of a total national strategy. The idea of a total national strategy grew out of a belief that South Africa faced a "total onslaught". "Total onslaught" is the term used to describe the strategy of overthrowing South Africa's present order by military, political, diplomatic, religious, psychological and cultural means. The enemies that wage this onslaught are not considered to be limited to only communists but include the West which sees South Africa as a threat to Western interests in the rest of Africa. Adoption of the total national strategy also led to a "rationalization" or reorganization of the civil service.

Botha gave the idea of a constellation new backing and new prominence, making it a major foreign policy initiative. In March 1979 P.W. Botha described a constellation as "a common approach (of Southern African nations) in the security field, the economic field and even the political field." [Ref. 24: p. 41] P.W. Botha tried to reassure leery neighbors by describing a constellation as a grouping of "states that derive from their fixed proximity to each other a common interest whilst maintaining their individual sovereign status. This concept thus specifically excludes a satellite relationship...." [Ref. 30: p. 51] It was assumed that a group of moderate states led by responsible leaders

motivated by common, pragmatic interests would come into being. This would lead to cooperation within the existing political order. The political will for this cooperation would "be strengthened by expanded relations in the non-political technical and economic fields." [Ref. 31: p.20]

Foreign Minister Pik Botha provided one of the first definitive explanations of the constellation on 7 March 1979 before the Swiss-South African Association. South Africa, he said, envisions:

1. That the countries of Southern Africa are bound by common interests in the areas of security, agriculture, commerce and transportation, health, labor, power and energy.
2. A constellation as an opportunity for regional solutions to regional problems.
3. A constellation as a means by which the moderate countries of Southern Africa can face a Marxist threat.
4. A constellation would join states in cooperative self-defense.
5. The constellation would operate on the basis of the existing political order. This implies that age old insistence of non-interference in domestic politics. [Ref. 26: pp.19-22]

This last point has significant implications for the recognition of the independent homelands and Namibia. This point has also played a significant role in the lack of success in attracting to the Constellation any states other than independent homelands. And once again, economic links between states hold a crucial role in the expected success

of the constellation of states. Not only was it expected that economic links such as transportation would create closer political linkages but some in the government saw closer diplomatic ties as inevitable because of these non-political contacts. The Prime Minister has assigned much responsibility for making the constellation work to the private sector. Private sector cooperation and coordination would not only pave the way for inter-governmental structures but will also help avoid any difficulties arising from official government to government overtures. Herein lies the South African Transport Services' call to arms.

Shortly after Robert Mugabe's electoral victory in 1980, following the Lancaster House agreement, he demonstrated his intention not to work within a South African constellation by denouncing the idea and joining the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC). Botha's earlier reservation of a place in the constellation for the ill-fated Bishop Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government undoubtedly did not aid in endearing Mugabe to the constellation idea. Because of Zimbabwe's strong manufacturing sector and its geographic position as a transportation crossroads for the SADCC countries, its denial of membership in South Africa's Constellation effectively killed the idea, far more than any other majority ruled country's refusal to join.

In so far as the Constellation is concerned, what has evolved is an inner constellation of South Africa and the independent homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. These entities are joined by a Multilateral Development Council of Ministers and at the department and technical level the Multilateral Economic and Finance Committee which has seven Multilateral Technical Committees, one of which is transportation. In May 1980 the Constellation of States formed an inter-state transport committee, composed of senior officials from the four constellation 'countries'. Subsequently, this committee has appointed tourism, technical and civil aviation working groups. [Ref. 24: p. 155]

In terms of its original objectives of an organization of seven to ten states of over 40 million people the constellation of states has failed. Furthermore South Africa now has another contentious organization on its hands which may form only another obstacle to better relations with independent Black states. Also these same independent black states have formed their own "counter-constellation", SADCC. And though few people believe that it will actually succeed in its principle aim of severing dependence on South Africa, its very continued existence speaks for its success where South Africa has failed.

The South Africa Transport Services, SATS, however, has succeeded where the government has not by not only

maintaining but also strengthening organizational ties to transport organizations of neighboring states. In this way one may see hope for improved interstate relations.

The failure of closer regional ties in the late 1970's was followed by stepped up ANC and SWAPO violence in the early 1980's. The South African government saw a direct link between the increase in violence and the organizations' presence in Mozambique and Lesotho (ANC) and Angola (SWAPO). This threat to South Africa's security has been countered by continued occupation of Angolan territory, support to UNITA and RENAMO and raids on ANC hideouts in Maseru, Lesotho and Maputo, Mozambique.

These actions have been described as a policy of "destabilization" (a deliberate program to undermine a neighboring state's government possibly with the aim of its overthrow), and have also been termed a "forward" or "offensive" foreign policy. Throughout these periods of hostilities SATS has maintained continuous business relations with its sister organizations.

B. DR. LOUBSER AND TRANSPORT DIPLOMACY

Jacobus G.H. Loubser was General Manager during the period 1970-1983 of the South African Railways and Harbours Administration (SAR&H) and after a name change on 1 October 1981 to the South African Transport Services (SATS). Loubser

originated the term "transport diplomacy" to describe his philosophy and actions in relations between SAR&H and their corresponding transport organizations in other Southern African states. This section will describe Loubser's philosophy and principles of implementing his concept of transport diplomacy independently and as an integral part of South Africa's regional foreign policy. Loubser's personal conviction that through the non-political agency of the railways closer and more harmonious working relationships could be established with neighboring states meshed with and complemented the South African government's desire for dialogue and detente in the early 1970's, and more recently, a Constellation of Southern African states.

Loubser started working in the SAR&H at the ground level. In these positions he gained an appreciation and understanding of not only the mechanics of the railway business but also the employees and their needs and motivations. Contacts and relations made in these early days paid many dividends in improving morale and labor relations years later while General Manager. He was the youngest General Manager of the SAR&H and infused the SAR&H administration with a new sense of purpose and positive attitude.

South Africa's rapid industrialization in the 1960's caused an increase in the volume of freight traffic for the South African Railways (SAR). The early 1970's found the

SAR&H struggling to keep services running for this rapidly expanding South African economy. The difficulties manifested themselves in a dearth of rail capacity for high volume exports, causing the SAR&H to be "the biggest single bottleneck to the country's industrial growth." [Ref. 32: p. 23] Loubser undertook the task of improving the railways efficiency and effectiveness. The solution was found in technological innovations providing for "higher speeds, bigger loads and faster turn-around times," [Ref. 33: p. 3] capital improvements (doubling mainline tracks, purchasing rolling stock and electrification of lines), finding the best medium of transport for the commodity and end user assistance in financing projects (eg. Richards Bay bulk handling facility and the Sishen-Saldanha line).

The lack of competent lower-grade staff, the result of the Colour Bar and White union strength, was a problem Loubser had to face throughout his tenure. His solution was based on a close and continuous working relationship with trade unions and with labor representation of all races. The practice of working closely with labor continued throughout his thirteen year tenure and was instrumental in improving worker morale and in short-stopping labor related disruptions of service.

1. Transport Diplomacy

Loubser subscribes to Hans Morgenthau's view that diplomacy is "the art of bringing the different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern the national interest most directly." [Ref. 34: p. 3] Diplomacy thus seeks to use a nation's power to its greatest advantage. Citing the Greek historian Thucydides, Loubser argues that a diplomat gains maximum advantage by cultivating bonds between people based on common interests. These will be molded by increased contacts, an affinity of values and mutual understanding and cooperation [Ref. 34: p. 3]. Because transportation is one of the strongest links between nations, the conduit of commerce and communication, Loubser believed there was a place for the economic instrument of transportation in the political world of international relations.

"Transport diplomacy can thus be regarded as the art of enabling the transport potential of a country to perform a maximum role in that country's relations with other countries, for the furtherance of its own as well as the common interests." [Ref. 34: p. 5] In South Africa's situation of political isolation, transport diplomacy was viewed by Loubser as the strongest and most strategic antidote to isolation, a powerful means to realize the

Republic's potential for creating prosperity and bringing about stability in the subcontinent [Ref. 34: p. 8].

In the world of international politics Loubser became a not wholly traditional player by harnessing his personal and professional stature and prestige to his powerful tool, the SAR&H, to influence South African foreign policy formulation and execution. Furthermore, he sought to increase cooperation among Southern African states through these means.

The strength of this element, called the SAR&H, particularly in relation to its neighboring organizations, has been shown in previous sections. Most notable is its huge personnel roster and budget, making it the largest organization in South Africa if not the whole continent. (In 1983-84 SATS had a total of 240,863 personnel and expenditures in excess of Rand 6,457 million, approximately US \$3 Billion.) Thus, its clear importance to the government and economy of South Africa. Internationally, it is vital for the trading links and services that it provides to neighboring countries as far north as Zaire.

In an April 1982 lecture entitled "The Function of Transport as a Line of Inter-ration Communication in Africa", Loubser summed up his philosophy of development in Southern Africa:

1. Africa is different from the rest of the world and should not be placed in any preconceived mold.

2. To help the developing countries, what is needed is guidance, training and education along with money, machinery and food.
3. One must respect the pride of the African individually and nationally.
4. South Africa has the knowledge, experience and technology to help other African countries. Specifically this is African born, bred and tested.
5. Allow South Africa to be used, its expertise and facilities, because South Africa can play a dominant role in keeping trade routes open. [Ref. 35]

South African Transport Services believes it can and has fulfilled the needs implied in each of these points. Furthermore, Loubser feels that SATS is able to assist neighboring countries in the area of transport (especially rail and harbors) that will be the deciding factor in determining the economic survival of so many independent countries in Africa. Though the change in General Manager in 1983 produced a change in personal interests, the inter-organizational relationships between SATS and foreign transport organizations remains the same and continues to grow stronger through the inter-personal relations of the staffs.

a. Guiding Principles of Transport Diplomacy

Believing in the dominant position of SAR in relation to other nations and rail systems in the region,¹⁴

¹⁴Many communication channels of Southern Africa, besides transport, lead to or through South Africa. This is the result of heritage and modern efficiency. In transport, South Africa plays a dominant role in keeping routes open to her land-locked neighbors.

Loubser developed a philosophy of transport diplomacy that held that South Africa's railways could allow South Africa either to play a leading role in development of Southern Africa or incur the increasing hostility and animosity of neighboring states. Ultimately, Loubser believed that "normal trade relations are far more preferable than any other less friendly action and that this in reality discourages any alternative attitude." [Ref. 36] Therefore, SAR&H would proceed using the following principles as guidelines:

1. Provide assistance only when asked for it.
2. Base assistance on pragmatic business principles; ie. offered at cost and not as charity.
3. Provide assistance in such a manner that it will stimulate development without infringing on the sense of independence of the country concerned, but rather will help it to help itself. [Ref. 34: p. 12]

Points number one and two cannot be stressed enough for these are not just the guiding principles of transport diplomacy but the essence of all SAR&H and SATS' actions with foreign transport organizations. For Loubser this is based on a desire to do business not charity, the Christian belief of turning the other cheek even when repeatedly smitten, and a realization of political reality such that in no way does the SAR&H want to be seen or interpreted as forcing or coercing in any manner neighboring

transport organizations and thus their governments.¹⁵ Based on conversations with SATS officials, these principles appear to be firmly entrenched not just in the corporate hierarchy but throughout the organization's management.

In practice transport diplomacy takes various forms to include:

1. Sales of services by SATS to foreign users such as maintenance of track, locomotives and trucks¹⁶ and repair and maintenance of aircraft. This includes the hiring of equipment to neighboring rail systems. In October 1982 the following locomotives and trucks were on hire; 6 diesel locomotives to Zaire, 10 diesel locomotives to Zambia, 8 steam locomotives to Mozambique, 9 steam locomotives to Zimbabwe, 10 steam locomotives to Swaziland and 109 wagons to Swaziland. [Ref. 37]
2. Management personnel and technicians provided by SATS for managing and training foreign railway management and technicians. Former SATS personnel are currently the General Managers of Malawi and Swaziland railways and SATS operates the small spur line in Lesotho for the Lesotho government.
3. Exchange of technical information and research conducted by SATS. The RSA has conducted the research to give it the world's largest and most efficient narrow gauge railroad (1065mm). Its equipment and techniques are designed for African conditions and are compatible with most rail systems in southern Africa. This information and research is freely exchanged on an ad hoc basis as well as at regional transportation conferences held periodically throughout Southern Africa.

¹⁵This was revealed in conversations with SATS employees and officials. In conversations with officials of recipient nation's transport services this same attitude was expressed, though somewhat more hesitantly.

¹⁶Note the words 'trucks' and 'wagons' are what Americans call "railroad freight cars". A 'coach' is a railroad passenger car. A 'lorry' is what Americans mean when referring to highway load carrying vehicles.

4. Research and planning is conducted for neighboring rail systems by SATS personnel. A most recent example is the design recommendations for a transport system to enable Botswana to export its coal reserves. Due to a country's skepticism of South Africa's self-interest they will frequently insist on another Eastern or Western Bloc assessment. But, as a SATS official said, "Once they realize that we're telling the truth and that we have the best product for the best price, they come right back, sometimes a little sheepishly." [Ref. 38]
5. Capital investment and actual construction of some facilities most notably, in recent history, the Nacala rail line and the Rutenga-Beit Bridge connection.

Frequently the reluctance to urge or even offer assistance for fear of appearing to seek domination has resulted in additional loss and cost for the foreign railroad. Two examples are the Zambian reluctance to conduct trade through Rhodesia and then South African ports (despite the guarantees of operation and delivery by Prime Minister Vorster and Dr. Loubser) until the country was found to have critically low food stocks and be in desperate financial straits. SAR&H foresight enabled it to rapidly respond to Zambia's request for assistance. More recently, following the destruction of a key railway bridge in Mozambique traffic to and from Maputo was halted for over two weeks until the Mozambique Railways (CFM) requested that SATS send in a team to repair the bridge. Within two days rail traffic was once again flowing on the line and Mozambique began to earn foreign exchange.

On the other hand efforts at assistance also have been interpreted by critics of South Africa as "destabilizing" or as elements of South Africa's destabilization of its neighbors. The SATS finds this wholly erroneous. SATS' own self-interest is in stabilizing economic conditions and aiding in development, thus relieving political pressures on South Africa. "Destabilization" is seen by Loubser as a "convenient means to castigate South Africa and cover up the inherent destabilizing built into the economic and political structures of some neighboring countries' regimes." [Ref. 39]

Though it makes for extremely favourable public relations, the identification of transport diplomacy as purely altruistic, good-neighborliness must be labeled as naive at best. Though positive benefits accrue to all parties, especially South Africa's less developed neighbors, cooperation with neighboring countries and their transport organizations is undertaken for two reasons; economic gain and political/strategic.

The economic objectives are straightforward; SAR&H (now SATS) is a state owned business that by law must be run on business principles. Though the debate over the interpretation of this phrase has gone on for 75 years, Loubser and his successor Dr. Grove have stridently sought profitable undertakings for the SAR&H/SATS. In regards to

foreign commerce South Africa's neighbors are a lucrative source of income for SAR&H/SATS. In the words of Loubser "in the present juncture when the domestic demand for transport is not fully using the available capacity, the South African Railways is thankful to carry payable traffic from outside our borders. There can be no question that the Railways involvement in Africa does not rest on purely economic grounds. The Railways therefore complies in this respect with the basic legal injunction of operation according to business principles." [Ref. 34: p.22]

Relations with Mozambique in the past ten years provides a poignant example of this aim. Due to over 80 years of working together SAR&H was in a favorable position to understand the needs and be able to provide continued assistance to the newly independent Mozambique. In a similar manner Maputo was the key port (closest and cheapest) for imports and exports to the Transvaal, the major mining and industrial center of South Africa. By October 1982 the development of Richard's Bay, a bulk material handling port, and the projected rail link between Komatipoort and Swaziland had progressed to a point that Loubser was able to claim that South Africa is totally independent of its neighbors in transport. Though he conceded that stability in the region is key to continued stability in the Republic and thus South Africa cannot sleep easily while its neighbors go hungry. [Ref. 37]

Despite the lack of diplomatic relations and the anti-South African rhetoric from Maputo "all possible assistance was offered ...with due diplomacy at the highest level" to the Mozambican railway authorities with a view toward normalizing traffic. Assistance rendered by the SAR included steam and diesel locomotives as early as April 1975, train control apparatus, fork-lifts and spare parts. Also many diesel locomotives and a large number of railway trucks were repaired. Personnel for planning and trainers were provided. Such close ties paved the way in 1976 toward retrieving 169 SAR trucks and 186 Zairian RR trucks that were trapped on the Beira-Umtali line when Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia. The Zairian wagons were duly returned to Zaire. These close working relationships have continued to the present to the point of daily and continual communication between the two organizations, SAR&H/SATS and CFM.

Along with these good personal and organizational relations, SAR is receiving payment for this assistance and services. Formerly this was in foreign exchange but due to a lack of such in Mozambique, payment is made as an accounting credit against charges to South Africa for transporting goods on Mozambican rail lines [Ref. 40]. Perhaps more importantly for South Africa and SATS, it is an economic necessity that the railway line to, and the harbor of Maputo remain accessible to South Africa [Ref. 34: p.

22]. Consequently, it is also in South Africa's own interest to provide technical and operational assistance. Interdependence of the Railways and the domestic economy means that what is good for the country is also good for the Railways, and vice versa [Ref. 34: p. 23].

SAR is primarily a business venture which makes use of opportunities to earn money from transport activities. However, the Railway's involvement in the rest of Africa does not arise solely from financial considerations. If this were the case then the Railways would have to halt operations when it begins to operate at a loss. This is not the policy of the Railways for "as a transport organization with one leg firmly in the public sector and the other in the private sector, the Railways with its involvement in Africa, offers unique opportunities which are not accessible to any government department...." [Ref. 34: p. 23] Loubser believed that the railways had a "greater calling" and he saw his duty "to use these opportunities to the fullest extent for the benefit of South Africa in many directions and in particular in the international political sphere." [Ref. 34: p. 23]

Specific political results that South Africa feels are gained from these relations include:

1. Open communication channels which lay the foundations for better understanding on a personal level which lead to better understanding between nations.
2. Perpetuation of an image of South Africa's good intentions towards Black Africa, thus avoiding the

conclusion that South Africa is forsaking the rest of Africa.

3. Normalization of trade relations which create a forum for discussions at other levels and form a basis for an unfolding of the outward policy and possibly also the constellation of states." [Ref. 34: p. 25]
4. Recognition by foreign transport organizations and their governments for the efficiency, quality of service and integrity of SATS.

Men as politically astute and knowledgeable of the Southern African region as South Africa's politicians and businessmen are not blind to the strategic implications of such close cooperation as that conducted by SATS and its foreign sister organizations. Transportation and the corresponding revenues and the ancillary development that accompanies it is crucial to the economies of every country in Southern Africa. Consequently, if South Africa through its parastatal transport organization is able to gain an intimate knowledge of the transport networks of its neighbors it may be able, in time of need, to control or destroy these systems. More subtle is the increased reliance of other Southern African nations on South Africa's rail lines, ports, technology and personnel which would enable South Africa to apply pressures to the economic jugular of its neighbors.

Even the hint of such actions on behalf of the SATS brings vehement denials from Loubser and other SATS officials. And so it should, because these individuals and SATS as an organization are "opposed to the use of transport

to achieve non-economic objectives." [Ref. 34: p.25] However, this is not only contrary to his thoughts cited earlier in this paper but it is only naive to believe that other officials of the government have not also realized the potential for offensive use of transportation. This was particularly true during the late 1970's and early 1980's as the cordon sanitaire crumbled around South Africa and the advance of Marxism was seen as suddenly knocking on the door.

None of this is to suggest that South Africa is seeking, or SATS is aiding in a quest for economic or political domination via transport diplomacy. But it does mean to suggest that South Africa aims for cooperation with its neighbors along with maintaining a policy of non-interference in internal affairs. Loubser claims that "South Africa will trade and cooperate with any African state for mutual economic benefit, provided that a measure of recognition and "non-aggression" is offered in return. For it is our principal aim to achieve stability, peace and prosperity for all peoples of our sub-continent in the future." [Ref. 39] Through this cooperation the transport system of South Africa, that so closely interlocks with its neighbors, may prove to be the trump card in South Africa's fight against the inroads of diplomatic isolation and its perception of a Marxist threat in Southern Africa. At the worst, even critics of this functional hypothesis

acknowledge that if infrastructural cooperation does not lead to closer political ties, it does limit disintegration.

b. Results of Transport Diplomacy

Some specific results of transport diplomacy include;

1. A 1979 business agreement with Mozambique, a Marxist government and member of the OAU.
2. The pooling of regular air services with all countries south of Tanzania, Zaire and Angola. At one point agreements had been reached with many African nations for overflight and landing rights but on the eve of initiating such service an overzealous newspaper reporter killed the agreement with a headline of "SA BEATS AFRICA." [Ref. 38]
3. Orderly transfer of rolling stock across national boundaries presently hampered only by inefficient cargo handling on some lines and civil war activities in Mozambique and Angola.

More general results include;

1. The creation of trade between all states in Southern Africa estimated by Loubser to be worth at least a billion dollars per year in 1981.
2. Railway links, through SATS staff in various countries, have become a line of communication between governments. When a South African Trade Representative exists in a country he assumes the consular duties. However, SATS personnel have been used by South Africa and foreign countries as diplomatic couriers and negotiators when no "official" diplomatic relations have existed. Similarly, the foreign nation has viewed the SATS representatives in the same manner.
3. The building of mutual respect and understanding at the personal level among transport officials from different political persuasions and cultures. This is the result of working with each other on a daily basis.

4. SATS, through its work with and in other states has added to the image and perception of South Africa as a reliable supplier and trusted commercial partner.

It may require a leap of faith for some to imagine how trade creation and improved personal relationships can lead to interdependence and regional stability. However, it is this very faith which permeates conversations, literature and public presentations of virtually all SATS personnel. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that they will continue to work towards their vision of regional stability in transportation--if only out of self interest of self-fulfillment.

C. FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

There is a partial overlap between the following section and its predecessor. Because they cover a similar time period and the information is presented chronologically this is unavoidable. The focus of the following section is on the role of the transport bureaucracy in the formulation of South Africa's regional foreign policy. In order to remove any hint of causality this section has been segregated from the previous section which concerned itself with the outcome of that formulation.

This section will briefly explain the process of foreign policy formulation in South Africa, by first summarizing some background history of the changes in it. The process

during the past 10-15 years will then be examined for this is the period when, through transport diplomacy, the transport sector of government was able to play a role in policy formulation. Generally, foreign policy formulation in these years is considered in two phases. In the first phase, until Vorster's resignation in 1978, foreign policy was formulated within a loose informal system guided by the Prime Minister and the State Security Council (SSC) played an increasingly important role in the latter years of this period. The second phase, 1978 to the present, policy formulation has been in a more formal and tightly structured system in which the SSC plays an increasingly important role. Given that the subject of this thesis is transportation as an element of foreign policy, particular emphasis will be placed on the role the transportation bureaucracy has played (or quite often not played) in South African foreign policy formulation.

The following discussion is of necessity general because the decision making process has not been exposed to public scrutiny. Therefore it is not always possible to establish with certainty who made specific decisions or on what grounds those decisions were based. Furthermore, this discussion is not to imply a primary role for the transportation bureaucracy or any individual of that bureaucracy in the formulation of South African foreign policy during the past 35 years. Loubser, during his tenure

as General Manager of the South African Railway and Harbours Administration (SAR&H), did play a key role in implementing actions toward's South Africa's regional goals during the years 1970-1983, and through his transport diplomacy strengthened international (regional) relations Furthermore he was able to initiate business activities which overflowed into the diplomatic arena and which complemented entirely the policies of outward movement, detente and the constellation of states. However, it would be attributing to him a far too generous role to label him as anything more than one of the foreign policy elite.

1. Prime Ministers Malan 1948-1954, Strydom 1954-58, Verwoerd 1958-66

Throughout the early years of Nationalist rule (certainly until 1972 and the creation of the State Security Council, the SSC) the cabinet was the locus of decision making power. Though PM Malan maintained for himself the External Affairs portfolio, his impact on foreign affairs cannot be equated with that of his predecessors Hertzog and Smuts. He also more frequently sought the opinion of two of his cabinet ministers on foreign policy matters, Dr. Dinges, Minister of the Interior and Mr P.O. Sauer, Minister of Transport. And on occasion he used them to represent South Africa in the international forum [Ref. 24: p. 20].

Though he may have brought with him a bureaucratic loyalty to the South African Railway and Harbour Administration, Minister of Transport Sauer was a long time politician and it cannot be assumed that he sought any particular place for the SAR&H in regional relations. This is particularly true of the post-war era when the SAR&H was struggling to regain its wartime losses and did not have the resources for foreign relations other than maintaining the flow of trade.

During the Verwoerd era the Cabinet remained the center of foreign policy decision making, though the position of the Minister of External Affairs was raised in prominence, the result of the appointment of Eric Louw as Minister of External Affairs by Prime Minister Strijdom in 1955. Louw not only had the portfolio to himself but also the confidence of the Prime Minister to allow him a free rein. Foreign Minister Louw also reorganized the Department of External Affairs in an effort to improve contacts with Africa. This was accomplished in 1959 by establishing a separate Africa Division within the Department.

Geldenhuys identifies the Parliament as having slight influence in matters of foreign affairs, debating only topics such as relations with Rhodesia after their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. Parliament evidently was persuaded to refrain from debate on delicate foreign policy issues as a show of national unity or due to "security" considerations. [Ref. 24: pp. 28-29]

During the Verwoerdian era the business community was virtually the only non-official group of significant strength which from time to time may have helped to shape foreign policy. Being the largest business in the country, the SAR&H can be included in this grouping. Though, business' influence simply supported steps which made South Africa popular and opposed those which made it unpopular [Ref. 24: p. 30]. The Department of External/Foreign Affairs nonetheless valued the role the businessman could play in providing useful contacts abroad and the potential of trade in paving the way for the flag [Ref. 24: p. 30]. Economic contacts were used to retain and reinforce other contacts and in particular blunt attempts to organize action against the Republic.

Geldenuys identifies Mr. Steyn, Deputy Secretary of Commerce and Industry as carrying particular responsibilities in regards to South Africa-Rhodesia relations during UDI. The Minister of Transport and General Manager of the SAR&H are not specifically identified in his analysis but with the advent of UDI they were forced into a heightened interest of regional politics. This is due to the disruptions and alterations of rail service and trade with countries to the north, and South Africa's involvement in facilitating the failure of economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Business, for them, could not have been "as usual".

2. Prime Minister Vorster 1966-78

During the Vorster years, 1966-1978, decision making was often a haphazard process involving only a tiny number of participants. Prime Minister Vorster was a skillful chairman of his cabinet and invited wide discussion of foreign policy topics. He then provided the Cabinet with a firm lead on his decision. Quite frequently though, Vorster displayed a preference for unstructured decision making involving only one other person or a very small group. [Ref. 24: pp. 74-82]

Although the Prime Minister as head of government is ultimately responsible for foreign policy, it is wrong to attribute all initiatives to him personally or to him and the Foreign Ministry jointly. In many instances foreign policy initiatives originated elsewhere in the machinery of government [Ref. 24: p. 72]. Loubser and SAR&H occasionally found themselves in just this situation, of having originated foreign policy actions and providing the government a fait accompli. It may be a tribute to his strong position in the government or his understanding of the government's foreign policy objectives that he was able to accomplish these actions and remain in position as General Manager.

As a result of Vorster's informality, other elements beside the Prime Minister and Department of External Affairs

were allowed into the foreign policy arena. The Parliament was at best a debating forum on some subjects dealing with foreign affairs. The opposition was looked upon as disloyal and therefore not allowed an effective voice in policy determination. Of course when the opposition is supportive of the government's position, eg. Progressive Federal Party (PFP) support of the Constellation of States as a springboard of constructive foreign policy action, it greatly reinforces the government's posture. The ruling National Party, via its party discipline, tried to present a united front though the need for secrecy in foreign relations was frequently given as the reason to keep all elements of the Parliament in the dark. A veil of secrecy was a particularly favorite ploy of Foreign Minister Muller. In 1974, at a time when African countries did not want to acknowledge their relations with South Africa, Muller claimed that "by preserving confidentiality...one creates confidence in the minds of those involved in the matter. One would not like to shake their confidence and thwart the progress that has been made." [Ref. 24: p. 50] The National Party had a caucus and a study group within the caucus, ostensibly to inform the party policy makers on aspects of policy. "Rather than initiators of policy these groups act as forums for the government to announce and explain, to sound out its followers and to mobilize support." [Ref. 24: p. 67] They may also serve as a means to identify acceptable

limits to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

[Ref. 24: pp. 59-67]

Some foreign policy and government analysts attribute an influence, or possible source of influence, to the Afrikaner Broederbond. SAR&H was one of the first organizations dominated by Afrikaners, though direct influence by the Broederbond is denied by officials of SATS. A conspiratorial interpretation of the South African government and foreign policy seeks explanation in the organization of the Broederbond. And SATS, being an Afrikaner dominated organization and a government supervised body it is inferred that the Broederbond has members in SATS and thus some degree of influence in this organization. This suggestion produces vehement and lengthy denials from SATS and government officials. Geldenhuys, by using writings of Broederbond biographers and historians (Pelzer and Serfontein) identifies instances in which the Broederbond took part in government policy decisions, though often as only a sounding board and support base. In line with the Afrikaner Broederbond's business of "securing stable political control for the Afrikaner" [Ref. 24: p. 173] the Broederbond has committees studying various aspects of South African government, society, political and foreign policy in order that it may assist the Prime Minister.

In 1972 a new cabinet committee, the State Security Council (SSC), was created by the Security Intelligence and

State Security Council Act. It is designed to advise the government on the "formulation and implementation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic." [Ref. 24: p. 92] Due to its composition of many cabinet ministers and co-opted civil servants and technocrats when required, it can insure inputs in somewhat more than the haphazard fashion referred to above. Though the Cabinet remained the locus of foreign policy decision making during the Vorster years, the SSC often provided the cue to the Cabinet which did little more than ratify these decisions [Ref. 24: p. 92]. During the Vorster years (until 1978) the locus of foreign policy decision making often shifted between these organizations (SSC and Cabinet), though the SSC tended to confine itself to strictly security matters.

Five officials are by law permanent members of the SSC:

1. head of the National Intelligence Service,
2. head of the Police,
3. head of the SADF,
4. Director General Foreign Affairs,
5. Director General Justice.

The SSC has a working committee of about eleven heads of departments and the chairman of the working groups of the other cabinet committees. Because of the vital link that trade provides to an otherwise isolated South Africa the

Minister of Industries, Commerce and Tourism as well as the Minister of Transport and the SATS General Manager have a standing co-optation to the SSC [Ref. 24: p. 100] and [Ref. 38] It is at this point that the bureaucratic input such as that by Loubser and the Minister of Transport is provided. Thus through the SSC top civil servants have become involved in foreign policy formulation. However, unlike cabinet ministers and other politicians the civil servant is not directly accountable to the Parliament and electorate. For the General Manager of the SATS this is only partly true, for he must answer to parliament each year via the budgetary process.

P.W. Botha has strengthened the SSC and his position as its head. He has created a team concept of government composed of politicians and professionals to provide expert input. This structure has produced criticism that decisive leadership is now lost in committee [Ref. 24: p. 95]. The implications of this decision making structure in foreign policy include:

1. It may prevent ad hoc policy formulation in favor of coordinated long term and inter-departmental planning.
2. It allows the SSC to make many final decisions in foreign policy. In other instances it provides the cue to the Cabinet for its decision concurrence.
3. It provides for checks and balances in the system.
4. It makes foreign policy formulation no longer the preserve of a select few. [Ref. 24: p. 92]

Since the inception of the SSC, Loubser has been a frequent participant of the SSC meetings. This has been the result of his personal high standing with Prime Minister Vorster, his position as head of the largest commercial and government organization in South Africa (SATS has a budget and manpower roster larger than any department of the government to include the SADF) and in the eyes of some people in government the utility of the economic lever (ie. transport) in formulating foreign policy towards states of Southern Africa.

As mentioned previously, during the Vorster years Loubser was sometimes concerned that he had too free a rein in executing transport diplomacy. Following the Botha government's election in 1978 Loubser was repeatedly called upon to explain his actions before the Cabinet and the SSC as a means of educating the Cabinet ministers. He was also called upon and encouraged by the government to make more public the advantages and positive results of his diplomatic efforts. Such public and government awareness strengthened the position of Loubser and transport diplomacy as an instrument. Unfortunately, it also removed the secrecy surrounding some inter-state actions which recipients of South Africa's efforts may have found embarrassing to have publicly revealed.

Development aid is another instrument of foreign policy which is possibly debated by the SSC [Ref. 24: p.

131] and certainly involves the transport bureaucracy's input. South Africa considers itself to be ideally equipped to offer qualitative technological and economic aid to Africa. This is based on the perception of the experience of similar conditions to those faced by other African countries [Ref. 25: p. 229]. In fact, however, most of South Africa's aid is directed toward the homelands in an effort to make them viable independent states. This aim of South Africa's policy raises the unanswered question of why has transport not been used more extensively to bring the homelands into the regional sphere of economic activity. With the exception of busses for labor commuting and marginal feeder roads to the border industrial areas little in the way of transportation has been diverted towards the homelands. This is damning to the homelands given the key role transport plays in the economic development and thus viability of the homelands. SATS' input to the question of transport development aid would be through the Minister of Transport in the KEOSSA and the economic development branch of the Foreign Ministry.

a. Hawks vs. Doves

Loubser had to champion his transport diplomacy as a positive instrument of influence against arguments for short term results and accusations of "aiding the enemy". Though very much aware of the political mileage to be gained

from working on neighboring countries' reliance of SAR&H, Loubser consistently argued in favor of the longer term benefits of an "open line" policy.

Such discussions have pitted Loubser and other "doves" who supported the view that foreign country's close economic ties with South Africa would act as an incentive to their adopting a reasonable or moderate attitude towards the Republic against the "hawks" who sought to promote state security by the actual or threatened use of force. A major source of disagreement with Loubser's transport diplomacy has been the military. This illustrates the existence of a conflict between hawks and doves on ideas, tactics and possibly strategy for regional relations. It will also illustrate the nature of transport's role in bureaucratic politics in the South African policy making elite.

For purposes of simplicity it is easy to identify the military as "hawks" in foreign relations matters and transport (Loubser) as "doves". Hawks believe South Africa's main means of insuring security is the development and use of military and economic muscle, and believe these should be used in a coercive, punitive manner to counter threats to South Africa. They worry that South Africa may lose its ability to use these levers and thus seeks to increase the economic dependency of South Africa's neighbors. The hawk, therefore is supportive of the direct manipulation of economic ties. Such actions include

manipulation of exports to target states, restricting traffic to and from the target state, altering tariff rates, reducing migrant labor authorizations etc. The long term consequences of these acts are either discounted or ignored. Hawks are equally unconcerned about international condemnations of South Africa. For them destabilization is a desirable means to counter or pre-empt destabilizations directed toward South Africa.

Doves acknowledge the utility of military and economic strength but see the military as a "reserve force", providing substance to any implied threat of destabilization. Moreover, they see economic ties with neighboring states as a key determinant of political behavior. In their view, close economic links with South Africa provide an incentive for a foreign country to adopt a reasonable or moderate attitude towards the Republic. [Ref. 24: pp. 144-146]

Herein lies the source of disagreement on the use of transport in foreign relations. Transportation can be used as either a 'stick' or a 'carrot'.

Particularly since the invasion of Angola in 1975 the military has become increasingly involved in the government's decision making bureaucracy.¹⁷ This was

¹⁷The military's rise to greater influence and importance in South African domestic and international affairs is presently a popular topic and source of explanation of the "aggressive" or "offensive" foreign

formalized with the 1978 reorganization of the SSC, the election of the former Defense Minister to Prime Minister and the 1980 appointment of SADF Commander as Defense Minister. The bureaucracy of the SSC secretariat is also headed by a career military officer, General A.J. van Deventer. By acting as a "gate-keeper" on the SSC's agenda he can regulate to a certain extent the input to the council [Ref. 24: p. 93]. This influence of the military either through the attentive ear of the Prime Minister, the committee system or informal social contacts, tends to compound the sense of threat felt by many senior civil servants who do not have the high technocratic and management profile or do not enjoy the access to public decision making afforded by Defence Force status [Ref. 41: p. 147].

A counter to this argument of military influence in the SSC is that input from other government institutions has also been formalized in the new SSC, and that "...the Council at least partly owes its present character to an acknowledgement of the deficiencies and dangers involved in the military's dominance of decision making on South Africa's involvement in the Angolan War." [Ref. 24: p. 94] This same institutionalized balance provides something of a

policy. See Frankel, P., Pretoria's Praetorians Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. and Kolodziej, Edward and Horkavy, Robert E. (eds.), Security Policies of Developing Countries, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1982.

check to Loubser's concern that he was sometimes setting foreign policy on his own and sought SSC acknowledgement, if not approval and direction, to what he was already doing via his transport diplomacy.

This thesis has stated that under Prime Minister Vorster foreign policy formulation was centered in Vorster, the Department of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister Muller) the SSC and the Cabinet, possibly in that order. Frequently such formulation was also done on an ad hoc basis utilizing resident experts (bureaucrats and technocrats) regardless of their formal participation in the Cabinet or SSC. Under Botha the principles of foreign policy are largely determined in the context of the SSC in which the Minister of foreign Affairs is directly exposed to the military influence [Ref. 41: p. 149]. According to Frankel, soldiers at the top of the public policy making hierarchy give the process a distinctive strategic coloration and tend to push non-military political and economic variables of policy making aside. Even in the diplomatic field the military's presence has grown so that along with former generals as ambassadors, Defence Force personnel are increasingly prominent in negotiations and on diplomatic trips. [Ref. 41: pp.104-105]

If the military's presence is that pervasive and influential (a matter not wholly agreed upon apart from the quantitative facts) it would explain a sense of threat felt

by many senior civil servants who have neither the high technocratic profile nor the access to public decision making afforded to the Defense Force. It would also explain institutional tensions in the South African bureaucracy as different organizations jockey for positions in the public policy making process. [Ref. 41: pp. 147-148]

As operational foreign policy assets, the military and the SAR&H/SATS jockey to be participants in discussions regarding the utility of their facilities and personnel in the external environment. By virtue of its having a cabinet post and a permanent position on the SSC, since 1972 the military has been in a structurally stronger position to voice concerns on foreign policy matters than the SAR&H. The military's obviously large voice in the conduct of the war in Angola forced all other elements to take the military into account. Furthermore, as outlined in the 1977 Defense White Paper's exposition on a total strategy, the military appear to relegate transportation to a supporting role and would include it as a subordinate element in a "comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims...." [Ref. 24: p. 140] Through this manner of thinking, transportation, the largest state structure and key to economic and political future of the Southern African region, can be incorporated into the military's view of countering the total onslaught, but

apparently not as a separate entity. This line of reasoning would lead one to believe that transportation's participation in foreign policy formulation was limited and subordinate to the military's concerns. This is not believed to be the case, for the following reasons. Organizationally, Loubser headed the largest organization in South Africa and one of the most powerful in the region, and could not be taken lightly. In addition, Loubser commanded a great deal of personal respect in public service and business circles, the result of his revitalization of SAR&H and the successful record of his transport diplomacy. Lastly, his own personally close relationship with the Prime Minister guaranteed him an audience.

Throughout the Vorster years Loubser was able to conduct transport diplomacy as he saw fit with very few constraints or opposition. These efforts materialized in the Victoria Falls talks of 1975, the efforts to re-open the Rhodesia-Zambia border, and the continual cooperation with an independent Mozambique. The Botha years have not been marked by any serious deviations in the acceptance of transport diplomacy but by far more discussion and the need to sell transport diplomacy in and outside of the SSC. The 1981 withdrawal of locomotives from Zimbabwe is the major exception to this rule. In what can be interpreted as a loss for transport diplomacy, a business decision became politicized by the South African government. Given that

this occurred in the same time frame as SADF raids into Angola and Mozambique it added great fuel to the destabilization fire, and may in fact have been a deliberate punitive reaction to Zimbabwe's calls for sanctions against South Africa and an effort to alter Zimbabwe's talk of providing ANC sanctuary. It may also be interpreted as a indication of the military's ("hawks") success over transport "doves". (For one to discern exactly the military's position on this matter requires knowledge of the SSC proceedings of that era, an impossibility given the absolute secrecy of these proceedings is the norm. In light of the recent election of the "communist" Mugabe and the perception of this as a serious threat to South Africa it is assumed that the military would have been supportive of an effort to either weaken Mugabe's government or force it into moderating its position towards South Africa and the ANC. Loubser was definitely against using transport in this fashion.

A clear victim of the militarization of foreign policy in South Africa is the policy of regional economic cooperation. This policy, in which local capital and economic development planners have vested stakes, is compromised by SADF strikes into neighboring states. Economic instruments of foreign policy (such as transportation) "gain in effectiveness by a patient buildup of links and trusted relationships...they can be swiftly

undermined by threats and open or clandestine military strikes into states with which, ostensibly, correct relations are sought." [Ref. 42: p. 34]

This change in the structure and influence of the military in the SSC preceded the change in General Managers of SATS in 1983. Though a fine General Manager in his own right, Grove is not able to compete with the military influence in the SSC on regional policy matter to the same degree as Loubser was able to for several reasons.

1. Grove does not have the same degree of personal interest in transport diplomacy as Loubser. Transport diplomacy was Loubser's 'baby', which he nurtured and raised.
2. The current national economic crisis has confronted the General Manager with very severe business problems, forcing him to keep his transport services running "according to business principles" and to meet his other constitutional requirements. This precludes any but minimal personal interest to the foreign relations aspects of SATS activities.
3. Grove does not have the same personal high standing within the government that Loubser enjoyed, particularly in the latter half of his reign.

For these reasons it is doubtful that the transport bureaucracy will enjoy the same favorable stature that it had in the late 1970's and early 1980's. On the other hand Grove does have a good reputation as a successful manager and businessman and in the current difficult economic times may carry greater weight than previously.

Under the heading of the military and transport lies the question of how the military incorporates SATS in

their tactical or strategic plans. Unfortunately, at this juncture this question shall have to go substantially unanswered due to the secrecy surrounding such discussions. As has been shown, transportation routes have been built specifically for military purposes (eg. rail line to SWA in 1915; highways in northern SWA in the 1970's, extension of the Kazangula road in northern Botswana providing better access by SADF to the Caprivi Strip area). [Ref. 43: pp. 40-43.] Publicly the SADF denies any plans to utilize the SAR system in its strategic plans because the railroad is "too hard to repair." [Ref. 44] This is a somewhat surprising result given that the railways provide extensive internal lines of communication and the ability to move large volumes of materiel relatively inexpensively.

III. TRANSPORTATION AS AN ELEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

This paper has shown that the governments of Southern Africa have utilized their transport assets and organizations as tools of their foreign policy since the beginning of the colonial era. In an effort to better understand and organize these past actions and provide the beginnings of a theoretical framework regarding the use of transport in foreign policy, this chapter will examine some examples of the positive, negative and neutral use of transportation in foreign relations.

Though results are important for judging the effects of policies, of principle interest here is the intent with which a government acted when it utilized its transportation assets as a foreign policy instrument. Given the inherent difficulty of clearly identifying an individual's or group's motivation compounded by the lack of memoirs from regional leaders, intent has had to be surmised or hypothesized. The analysis that follows is based on conversations with some of the individuals involved, newspaper reports of the time, academic articles and books.

^{1*}For the sake of simplicity this discussion speaks of only two nation situations, the actor nation and the target nation, but it is recognized that in Southern Africa transportation is an element that can be used by more than

For a transport related action by the actor nation¹⁸ to effect the target nation, there must first be some sort of transport connection between them. This may range from bilateral trade to sharing a common border and transport network to operating the transport system of the other country. To have the desired effect, beyond harassment or nuisance value, a minimum level of reliance by the target nation on the actor nation must exist for that aspect of transport which is to be used. What this level of reliance is has not been quantified to my knowledge.¹⁹ It may very well be situationally dependent but would include the following;

1. Psychological factors: national will, willingness to make the requisite sacrifices; and influence of popular will on national leadership.
2. Economic factors- level of trade between the two nations ie. how much of the target nation's trade (either volume, value or percentage of GNP) is conducted with or through the actor nation and vice versa. Other economic factors or relationships that help determine a country's level of reliance include; the value or volume of transit trade; the ratio of external trade to GNP; the proportion of transit trade to total trade; the amount or level of benefits that the transit nation derives from the trade traffic of the target state; general overall economic health of the target nation.

one nation against another. The border closure by Zambia against Rhodesia later followed by Mozambique closing its border with Rhodesia is an example.

¹⁹See Appendix One for discussion of the concept of interdependence, vulnerability and sensitivity.

3. Geographical factors- availability of alternatives for the target nation and their efficiency.
4. Political factors- expectations of external support (eg. can the actor or target nation reasonably expect economic support to reduce the costs it incurs).

Each of these factors is analytically distinct but closely integrated in practice.

Transportation can be used as a positive influence from one nation to another. "Positive influence" is used here to mean a tactic for improving or warming relations between nations or improving the actor nation's international image. In Southern Africa actions with this intent include: economic aid, disaster relief assistance, area economic development and technical and managerial assistance and particularly an improvement of the efficiency or economy of the country's transport network. It also includes the less tangible actions of diplomacy involving organizational and personal ties and the commonality of interest that go along with them. The philosophy behind transportation working as a positive influence rests on the idea that aid to fellow nations will reduce personal and national ill will, creation of areas of common interest will increase the cost of disrupting those interests and personal and organizational communication will replace, supplant or initiate inter-governmental communication. To be able to positively influence another country the following criteria need to be present:

1. The actor nation/transport organization needs to have the assets, facilities and capability to carryout the proposed aid or assistance.
2. Individuals and organization must be willing to put aside political and cultural differences in order to lessen or neutralize their adverse effects.

Transportation can also be used as a negative or punitive foreign policy instrument. This means that transportation can be used by the actor nation to change the target nation's behavior by imposing or threatening to impose costs of various sorts on the target nation as punishment for past actions or to prevent their recurrence. This can take the form of, discriminatory freight rates, denial of access to facilities such as landing rights or border closings, embargoes on the haulage of specific commodities, and physical destruction or disruption of the target nation's transport facilities. An indirectly negative use of transport is the search by the actor nation for alternative trade routes so as to avoid use of the target nation's facilities. This is also done as a means of developing new areas or as a means by which a nation better postures its options with no overt intention for foreign policy implications. To be able to negatively influence another country, a nation must meet the following criteria:

1. It must have have a dominant position in relation to the target country over that aspect of transportation it intends to use; ie. if border closure is the tactic, then for it to have an effect the target nation cannot have an alternative outlet that can absorb the diverted traffic.

2. The opportunity costs for the target nation must be greater than the opportunity costs for the actor. These include but are not limited to financial costs of lost revenues or the additional costs of alternative routing of traffic.
3. The actor nation must be prepared to neutralize or overcome efforts of the target nation to counter pressure; such efforts would include diplomatic and legal action under terms of UN treaties and conventions guaranteeing the right of transit to landlocked nations,²⁰ potential military threat.

A cost most frequently ignored or discounted is the legality of the act under international law or the effect imposition of the action will have on the actor's international standing.

Neutral actions are those undertaken with no specific foreign policy concern in mind such as the creation of new rail lines or air routes based wholly on narrowly defined economic considerations. Along this line of thinking, transportation can also be found to be a victim rather than an instrument of foreign policy. Unlike the situation in which transport facilities are purposely destroyed, regional tensions may result in a deterioration or overuse of a transport network the result being its debilitation. Depending on one's point of view this may have a positive or negative effect and may even be the basis for accusations of using transport as an instrument of policy.

²⁰The 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States in UN Treaty Series, vol 579 no 8641.

A. EXAMPLES OF EFFORTS AT POSITIVE INFLUENCE

The most notable example of the use of transport diplomacy as a tool of positive influence in foreign policy is the practice of transport diplomacy by Loubser and the SAR&H/SATS during the period 1970-1985. Due to the nature of this strategy (ie. its emphasis on protracted inter-personal relations, building trust and common interests) it is not appropriate to identify only one act but rather a series of actions to exemplify transport diplomacy. As an example of transport diplomacy in action one may look at SAR&H-Mozambican Railways (CFM) relations from 1975 to the present.

1. South African-Mozambican Transport Assistance 1975-1985

a. Background

As one may recall from Chapter 1, transport development in the Transvaal region and Mozambique have always been closely related, the former providing the reason and wherewithal, the latter the port of Lourenco Marques (now Maputo). This symbiotic relationship continued until Mozambican independence at which point the Republic of South Africa had to decide whether it would work with a Marxist government and Mozambique had to decide whether it could afford to disengage itself from the white majority governments (Rhodesia and South Africa).

b. Action

Transport diplomacy with Mozambique began even before the independence celebration via close coordination between the two transport services. Despite a lack of diplomatic relations between governments, Loubser was invited to attend the independence celebration. At this point he made a personal judgement that proper relations could be maintained with the Mozambican railways (CFM) despite hostile rhetoric from the Mozambican government. Business relations between the two organizations continued after independence, though traffic fell off as a result of harbor inefficiency and poor maintenance of the railroad. As the lack of skilled manpower became more crucial in Mozambique the National Director of the Mozambique Ports and Railways (DNPCF), Mr. Alcantara Santos, began to work closely with Loubser to organize assistance from the SAR&H. This took the following forms:

1. Repair and rebuilding of locomotives shortly after independence as well as more recently (September 1984). Repair of rail lines damaged in Mozambican civil war. eg. January 1985.
2. Managerial training of CFM staff. Training of Mozambican railwaymen in all levels and manner of transport operations has also taken place. This has even been taken to the extreme of operating the port of Maputo.
3. Talks held in March 1977 on ways to improve traffic to Maputo and ways for SAR to encourage South African business to utilize the port of Maputo. The SAR&H-CFM 1979 business agreement signed 26 February 1979 provided for the continuation of healthy business practices between neighboring states and the

ties of friendship which flow from them. This agreement also required South Africa to keep the tariff rate from Johannesburg to Maputo below that of Johannesburg to Durban.

4. Assistance in expanding the capacity of the rail line from Maputo to South Africa at Komatipoort, this has included the installation of a Centralized Traffic Control system on the Komatipoort-Maputo line. South Africa has provided materials for the above projects.
5. Cooperation with Mozambique's objective of not trading with Rhodesia by insuring that Rhodesian exports go through South African ports.
6. Attendance by both parties at periodic conferences of engineers.
7. The September 1984 accord arranged between the Minister of Transport of South Africa and the Director General of Mozambican Railways for the repair of six locomotives.
8. SAR representatives have acted on behalf of the government on courier and representative capacities.

c. Objectives

1. South Africa wanted to maintain business relations with Mozambique.
2. South Africa wanted to maintain access to the Port of Maputo.
3. South Africa wanted to moderate the government's anti-apartheid stance via friendly business relations.
4. South Africa sought to pave the way for government to government communication.
5. Mozambique sought to maintain in operation the transport network as a means of furthering development and earning foreign exchange.

d. Results

The business objectives have all been clearly met in that relations have remained open and continuous even during periods of hostility between the two countries such as followed a January 1981 SADF attack on an ANC headquarters in Matola, a port city next to Maputo. Despite this action the General Managers of the two national transport services spoke to one another the very next morning seeking reassurance of non-involvement and a continued relationship. Presently business relations are maintained on a daily basis via SATS representatives in Maputo and CFM representatives in Johannesburg. However, traffic flows have steadily fallen over the past ten years. In part this is due to the fact that the efficiency of the port of Maputo and the rail lines servicing it have not always been up to the standard that South African businessmen prefer.

Whether the open relations of the transport organizations have paved the way for closer government relations is clearly debatable. The CFM insists on all relations being business like and between transport services, not inter-governmental. In light of the hostility mentioned above ("it was a state of war" according to one SATS official), South Africa's support of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and Mozambique's efforts to

distance itself from South Africa one cannot easily claim a warming of diplomatic relations between the two governments. This perception has changed somewhat since the Nkomati Accord of March 1984. SATS personnel had a very modest diplomatic role in bringing about this accord. At the same time transport diplomacy has not contributed to a worsening of relations. Mozambique transport officials are content, if not pleased, with the state of relations with SATS, though they feel that South African businessmen should provide financing to renovate the port that they use.

Consequently, transport diplomacy receives good marks on business grounds but does not appear to have met its political goals.

2. South African Assistance to Zambia 1975-Present

a. Background

Prior to Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Zambia conducted its trade principally through Rhodesia to the Mozambican and Southern African ports. Some copper exports did pass over the Benguela line to Lobito, Angola. Following UDI Zambia tried assiduously to cut its reliance on Rhodesian Railways. This was successful only to a limited degree. In 1973 Rhodesia removed the option of traffic from Zambia by closing the Rhodesia-Zambia border. Even when Rhodesia offered to allow some

commodities through, Zambia felt this an opportune time to sever ties with the White south. Within two to three years it was clear that Zambia's alternative routes were not meeting her needs.

b. The Action

The first efforts by SAR&H at diplomacy with Zambia Railways during the post 1973 period were an integral part of the Kaunda-Vorster detente initiative of 1974-75 and were based on Loubser's long time friendship with the General Manager of Zambian Railways, Mr. Mazurka. SAR&H played a key role in organizing and supporting the Victoria Falls talks in August 1975. During these talks, in private conversation with President Kaunda, Loubser and Prime Minister Vorster tried unsuccessfully to get Kaunda to reopen the border and relieve himself of a growing economic calamity. Prime Minister Smith of Rhodesia was even persuaded to guarantee safe passage of Zambian goods and equipment.²¹

The second effort at transport diplomacy toward Zambia began in 1978 at which time Zambia's alternative routes had substantially failed her and the economic troubles and food shortages were becoming the source of

²¹See Geldenhuys book, "The Diplomacy of Isolation", pages 271-271, for a transcript of the conversation. The contents of which were confirmed in private conversation with Dr. Loubser.

domestic discontent and unrest. The open lines of communication that had been maintained through the years by Loubser and his Zambian counterpart now paid their dividends. The request for assistance was made by telephone from Zambia to South Africa and immediately followed up with a meeting between the General Managers to identify specific needs and means of assistance. Within hours ships carrying maize for Zambia were diverted to South African ports and the required food and fertilizer were moving north to Zambia. Soon copper began moving south for export. South Africa also loaned Zambia four locomotives and some wagons to speed up the movement.

c. South African Objectives

In the first case;

1. South Africa was seeking detente, a rapprochement with the frontline states. Trade relations were believed to be one way of building that rapprochement.
2. Initiation of traffic/trade through Rhodesia was seen as another way of increasing influence over Rhodesia to moderate its position toward a settlement. Rhodesia's 1973 border closure was executed without consulting South Africa who very strongly opposed it.
3. South Africa sought an increase in railway revenues.
4. South Africa sought an improvement of international and regional image by providing humanitarian assistance to Zambia.

In the second case;

1. South Africa's objective was to answer a request for humanitarian aid and thus improve the image of South Africa by aiding a nation in need.

2. South Africa hoped to build better relations with the frontline states.
3. South Africa wanted to increase revenues to the SAR&H and traffic to the South African ports which were suffering a slowdown in traffic.

In regards to Zambian objectives, Zambia resorted to this out of necessity to get fertilizer for planting, food for eating, and reliable ports for copper exports in order to comply with IMF requirements for increased production.

d. Results

1. In the first case, given that Zambia did not accept the South African proposal to begin trade through Rhodesia this example of transport diplomacy did not achieve any of its objectives save for reminding Kaunda of South Africa's willingness to provide assistance.
2. In the second case, Zambia got the needed fertilizer and food and copper exports began to travel to South African ports within three weeks.
3. This action allowed South Africa to show the world its efficiency and ability to work with Black African states. South African Railways assisted Zambian Railways with the loan of four locomotives. Air traffic between the two countries was re-started in August 1979.
4. SAR&H received a boost to its revenues and the increased traffic helped revitalize the port of East London.
5. Zambian acceptance of South African assistance caused a crisis in relations between Zambia and Tanzania, and other frontline states. Tanzania stood to lose a good deal of traffic and its associated revenue, many of these states also interpreted Zambia's actions as selling out to the White south.
6. The SAR&H was hailed in South African press as honorary diplomats. This action added support to the idea of the importance of economic ties for the constellation of states, and enhanced Loubser's position in the government.

7. A long term effect is that traffic from Zambia has not stopped flowing since 1978, and, having seen Zambian success, in 1979 Zaire began to divert some of its exports to South African ports.
8. Via the resultant continuous communications, difficulties in the business of trade, such as backlogs in traffic or non-compliance of agreements, have been easily resolved within the transport organizations.
9. This action demonstrated the weight of economic necessity versus political desire.

B. EXAMPLES OF NEGATIVE TRANSPORT ACTIONS

1. Zambia-Rhodesia Railway Crisis of 1966

a. Background

The first foreign policy directed shots fired using the weapon of transport between Zambia and Rhodesia occurred shortly after UDI as a result of Zambia's efforts to implement financial sanctions against Rhodesia. As a left over from the days of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Rhodesia Railways was still jointly owned by both countries. The majority of maintenance facilities and the administrative offices were located in Rhodesia. At Broken Hill, Zambia was located another accounting center for the collection of freight charges on Zambian imports and copper exports. Due to the rate structure of the railroad, this amounted to the great majority of all railway revenues. Because she controlled these transport revenues, Zambia believed that she had a viable lever by which she could influence Rhodesia.

b. The Action

Through exchange controls in 1965 Zambia had begun to restrict money flow to Rhodesia as part of the British sponsored sanctions towards Rhodesia. Suddenly in April 1966 Zambia cut-off all payments from the railway's accounts to Rhodesia.

c. Objectives

The intent of this major foreign policy initiative which jeopardized the transport of ninety percent of Zambian exports and thus her developmental program was;

1. To pressure Rhodesia by depriving her of one million Pounds sterling per month in revenues.
2. To pressure the British economy and thus the government into doing more towards Rhodesia by denying Britain 40% of her copper imports

Having no alternative means of expeditiously exporting her copper and still feeling bound to Rhodesian Railways by tradition and contract, Zambia was in a decidedly weaker position than Rhodesia. In May 1966 Rhodesia put into effect the requirement that all freight charges for traffic into Zambia via Rhodesia Railways had to be paid in advance to Bulawayo and similarly for Zambian exports. Copper exports were immediately affected because the Zambian government would not allow the copper companies to make the payments. Likewise, Zambian imports were held up in Mozambique, South Africa and Rhodesia. Within two weeks

the Zambian government relented and allowed payment of rail freight for goods contracted prior to the Rhodesian action and later all "essential supplies". A month later Zambia allowed copper export shipments to be carried by Rhodesia Railways. After another year of protracted negotiations agreement was finally reached for the division of Rhodesian Railways.

d. Results

The crisis of May-July 1966 failed in its immediate goal of pressuring Rhodesia into a settlement for UDI, but it did effectively cancel the international agreements that obligated governmental and business organizations in Zambia to patronize Rhodesia Railways at the expense of other routes [Ref. 45: p. 156]. This opened the door for Zambia to utilize the Benguela line to Lobito, Angola and seek alternative routes through politically acceptable neighbors. Discussions to this effect were begun in 1966 and agreement reached to ship 40,000 metric tons per month (two-thirds of Zambian production) through Zaire. Though these quantities were never fully realized these talks were a diplomatic triumph for Zambia in its efforts to disengage itself from transport dependency on the white ruled south.

2. Rhodesia-Zambia Border Closure

a. Background

The six and a half years following the May 1966 railway crisis did not bring Zambia and Rhodesia closer but further apart and in the transport arena were marked by Rhodesian demands for a guaranteed percentage of traffic and increased freight rates and road taxes. Zambia's support for Joshua Nkomo's guerillas eventually was deemed intolerable by Rhodesia. This unwillingness to tolerate Zambian protection of the guerilla units climaxed in early 1973. Meanwhile Zambia's available alternatives for transport had changed considerably as shown in Tables IX, XI, X, XIII and XIV below.²²

As shown in the tables below (Table V, XI, XII and XIII) Rhodesia had reason to believe that it had a dominant, if not controlling position over Zambian trade.

b. The Action

On 9 January 1973, without previously consulting South Africa or Portugal (Mozambique), Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia announced the closing of the border between Rhodesia and Zambia as a reprisal for actions in

²²For a most complete analysis of Zambian transportation before and after UDI see: Eugene Harrison. "Reorientation of Transportation Patterns from Zambia after the Rhodesian UDI." Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1972.

TABLE V

Zambian Imports from Rhodesia
in Pre-devaluation British Pounds

<u>Imports from Rhodesia</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Zambian Imports</u>	<u>Rhodesian Share %</u>
1964 31.0 million	78.0 million		40
1965 35.5 million	105.5 million		34
1966 23.0 million	123.0 million		19
1968 11.5 million	177.5 million		7
1969 11.0 million	156.0 million		7

(the following are listed in Zambian Kwacha)

1967 32 million	306 million	10.5
1969 22 million	320 million	6.9
1971 21 million	333 million	6.3
1973 7.8 million	347 million	2.3
1975 nil	400+ million	nil
1979 nil	400+ million	nil

Source: [Ref. 46: p. 602] [Ref. 47]

Rhodesia by nationalist guerillas believed to be operating from Zambia. Within a day he announced that this closure did not apply to the export of copper [Ref. 43: p. 78]. However, it was too late to retrieve the lost traffic of this high freight rate commodity, for Zambia seized this opportunity to cut all transport ties with the white minority regime.

c. Objectives

Rhodesia's principle objective in closing the border was to receive some assurance from Zambia that Rhodesian guerillas would no longer operate from Zambia.

[Ref. 48] Rhodesia sought also to eat its cake by recanting a portion of its' border closure and allowing the copper exports to transit Rhodesia.

d. Results

1. Zambia countered Rhodesia's closure and recantation by not allowing copper traffic to transit Rhodesia because "Rhodesia would not return the empty railway wagons, which normally carry imports." [Ref. 45: p. 163]
2. Rhodesia lost approximately (Rhodesian) \$1 Million per month in lost revenue. This rose to R\$21 Million in 1975 with the loss of more transit traffic from Mozambique and South Africa [Ref. 23: p. 2]. E.G.Cross maintains that this border closure had little effect on the Rhodesian economy since manufactures were able to establish alternative outlets for their production. [Ref. 49: p. 25]
3. This action put Zambia and South Africa on the same side of the Rhodesian issue and helped pave the way for detente in the next year.
4. Zambia was forced to rely on other routes and expand their capacity by up to 75,000 tons per month to bring in general goods, coke and spare parts and machinery for the mines. This was done by greater utilization of the Benguela railroad and the Great North Road to Dar Es Salaam and later the TANZAM railway.
5. Zambia was forced cut to back on non-essential imports inadvertently improving her balance of payment situation.
6. Tanzania had to alter her transport patterns and provide essentially the entire port of Dar Es Salaam to Zambia. This was to the detriment of Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.
7. Zambia won international sympathy for her plight and received increases of U.N. and bilateral aid.
8. This action was a "watershed in South African politics" [Ref. 50: p. 287] resulting in a loss of popular and government support for Rhodesia. It also

sealed the doom of South Africa's hope to re-orient Zambia's foreign policy and trade towards South Africa before the completion of the TANZAM railroad. [Ref. 27: p. 79]

9. For Rhodesia this action did not achieve any of its intended objectives but did backfire on Rhodesia to a notable degree. Rhodesia appears to have "failed both to take into account the change in Zambia's trading patterns since 1965, and to give due weight to Zambia's readiness to sustain short term costs to maintain her political independence from the white south." [Ref. 27: p. 79] From Zambia's point of view, her counter measure was successful only to the degree that it enabled her to feel good about no longer using the Rhodesia Railway. Because, within all too short a time Zambia again needed to find cheap and reliable transit routes and sources of supply to satisfy the demands of her new consumers. An example of this problem of reliability and efficiency is shown by the following table detailing the availability of locomotives on what was to be Zambia's main export route, the TAZARA railway to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. This low motive power availability caused very long turn-around times for rolling stock; 11.4 days in 1976/77 and 26.1 days in 1981/82. [Ref. 51: p. 13]

TABLE VI

Total Number of Locomotives and Availability

Fiscal Year	76/77	77/78	78/79	80/81	82/83	83/84
Ave. No Avail.	51	52	39	23	29	33
Total Avail.	85	85	85	97	83	94
Avail. percent	60%	61%	46%	24%	35%	35%

Source: [Ref. 51: p. 13]

The true costs involved in choosing to use alternative routes can be better appreciated by reviewing the estimated cost of shipping a ton of copper along each route as shown below in Table VII.

TABLE VII

Estimated Cost per Ton to Ship Zambian Copper to European Markets via Various Routes (1967-68)

<u>Route</u>	<u>Cost/Ton</u>
Rail to Beira or L-M and ship to Europe	\$ 60
Rail to Lobito and Ship to Europe	\$ 60
Highway to Dar Es Salaam and ship	\$100
C-131 aircraft to Europe (full load return)	\$130
C-131 acft to Europe (only 60% load return)	\$210

Sources: Stanford Research Institute, Middle Africa Transportation Survey, in [Ref. 1: p. 470].

In theoretical terms then, Rhodesia failed to accurately assess Zambia's vulnerability to a border closure, and did not accurately weigh her own opportunity costs. The loss in revenues from Zambian copper and transit traffic from Mozambique and South Africa only increased Rhodesia's economic troubles.

3. Mozambique-Rhodesia Border Closing 1976

a. Background

Mozambique's first hint of border closure came in October 1975 in a UN address in which its representative stated that "FRELIMO and the People's Republic of Mozambique are ready to assume all responsibilities in conformity with their international duty." [Ref. 52: p. 85] Mozambique coordinated its policy towards Rhodesia with the other Frontline states. At a meeting at Quelimane, Mozambique in February 1976, Presidents Machel, Kaunda, Nyerere and Seretse Khama agreed to a common policy to support the guerillas. The "four frontline presidents also agreed that the Mozambican government should apply UN sanctions against Rhodesia and close the Mozambique-Rhodesia border." [Ref. 52: p. 85] For years prior to this time Rhodesia had been conducting across the border military operations in Mozambique. Following such an incident of 'hot pursuit' by Rhodesia in March 1976 President Machel announced the closing of the border and the seizure of Rhodesian property in Mozambique. Mozambique was confident that it would receive international aid to compensate it for at least some of its losses. It was also confident of the effectiveness of this action for by the mid-1790's a majority of Rhodesian external trade was moving by rail through Mozambique, 75% in 1972. [Ref. 53: p. 45]

b. Objectives

A principal objective of Mozambique's was to show support for the liberation struggle in accordance with UN and OAU decisions. They also sought to apply greater pressure on the Rhodesian government, in combination with support for the guerilla offensive in early 1976, to end UDI by entering serious negotiations on the transfer of power to a black government.

c. Results

1. This action closed the border, adding strength to UN sanctions.
2. All Rhodesian rail traffic now would have to use the SAR. Formerly, almost 80% of Rhodesian traffic had travelled directly to Lourenco-Marques.
3. This action put South Africa firmly in charge of Rhodesian trade.
4. This in turn made Rhodesia more susceptible to an attack on trade.
5. Mozambique lost \$57-\$74 million per year in railroad and port revenues and \$89-115.5 million through other effected losses. Approximately 16,000 Mozambican jobs were also lost as a result of this action. [Ref. 52: p. 87]
6. Rhodesia lost one sixth of its railway rolling stock (2300 wagons) worth approximately \$46 million. Most of these were returned after Zimbabwean independence.
7. Rhodesian raids on guerillas operating from Mozambique were increased.
8. The expected international aid for Mozambique did not materialize as quickly or in the amount expected, and when some of it did come it was in the form of loans which simply added to Mozambique's debt problem.

9. Ultimately, the effect on Mozambique was that it wanted a settlement in Rhodesia sooner and more earnestly.

4. South Africa-Rhodesia, 1970's

With the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963 Southern Rhodesia was able to pursue trade policies independent of its former partners. South African trade immediately began to increase due to the lessening or removal of tariff barriers. Following his election on a platform of Rhodesian independence, Ian Smith sought closer relations with South Africa. This was necessary due to the independence of Malawi and Zambia and the consequent realignment of powers in the region. Smith also sought South African reaction, hopefully support, for Rhodesian independence.

The signing of a South Africa-Rhodesia trade agreement in 1965 was interpreted by Smith as support for Rhodesian independence and on November 11, 1965 Rhodesia announced a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). South Africa wanted more trade and not an international crisis.

UDI held many disadvantages for South Africa:

1. It was a setback in its effort to create an acceptable international image.
2. South Africa did not want to be seen as the champion of White states, but South African White popular opinion demanded support for Rhodesia.

3. Above all it created an atmosphere of tension, uncertainty and instability that the South African government had hoped to avoid. In an effort to remain free of identification with the Smith government, South Africa refused to give it formal recognition. To preclude giving support to the concept of economic sanctions which had been suggested as a counter to South African apartheid policies, South Africa stood on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.

South Africa sought an end to the Rhodesian issue for the following reasons:

1. It placed outward movement in jeopardy.
2. It hurt the general South African image by having her identified as sustaining an illegal regime's economy and military.
3. Continued conflict might escalate to include foreign powers (eg. Cuba, Soviet Union). Or conflict may radicalize (create Marxists) the Blacks in Rhodesia and may spill-over into the Black South African population.

The Mozambican border closure in early 1976 put South Africa in the position of being able to control the economic and strategic life of the Rhodesian government. This is because South Africa now totally controlled Rhodesia's trade outlets. A world wide recession, inflation and overcrowding on the SAR also aided in applying pressure on Rhodesia by restricting Rhodesia's exports, imports and thus her growth. [Ref. 49: p.27]

5. South Africa-Zimbabwe, 1981

a. Background

Pretoria was shocked at the unexpected victory of Robert Mugabe in the independence elections of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Pretoria was concerned that the lesson learned by Blacks in South Africa would be that violence and military struggle is the way to independence and that moderates cannot win. Pretoria also saw an end to its constellation of states idea when Mugabe joined the SADCC. Given Zimbabwe's economic and geographic pivotal position in Southern Africa it has the ability to strongly undercut South Africa's position in the region, though Mugabe professed a desire to continue economic relations with his southern neighbor. Pretoria adopted an ambivalent and then hostile attitude toward Zimbabwe. In the field of transportation this began with threats of curtailing maize imports if railway trucks were not returned to South Africa. The hostile acts progressed to include the recall of SAR technicians, railcars and later, short term embargoes on traffic to Zimbabwe due to a backlog of goods awaiting shipment in South African ports.

These were credible threats given that the rail line to Beira only opened in February 1980 and the line to Maputo in October 1980. The pipeline to Beira was not operating until much later due to prolonged discussions between the nations over tariffs on oil. By March 1981 only

18% of Zimbabwe's imports and exports were flowing through Mozambique.

b. The Actions

The key action in this case was the withdrawal of locomotives that were on hire to Zimbabwe at the end of their contract in April 1981. Secondly, South Africa was accused of holding up import shipments, particularly oil, to Zimbabwe. This was done by insisting that full payment be received for one shipment before another one is made. [Ref. 54: p. 8] The political nature of some of these actions was clouded by the possibility of tangible economic necessity on the part of South Africa, such as an extra large grain harvest in 1981, and a reasonable need to alter the terms of the Preferential Trade Agreement, and providing 14 steam locomotives to Zimbabwe for shunting before all of the diesel locomotives were withdrawn.

c. Objectives

South Africa's objectives were;

1. To show that Black rule does not work.
2. To illicit cooperation from Zimbabwe.
3. To secure commitment from Zimbabwe to limit ANC presence.
4. To make Zimbabwe pay for her commitment to South African liberation movements and for her verbal attacks on South Africa.

5. To stifle any economic union of Black states that may promote Zimbabwe as a center and not South Africa.

d. Results

1. By September 1981 demand for transport in Zimbabwe was critical. Oil reserves fell to a three day supply and Zimbabwe had to turn away orders for the export of her maize. Zimbabwe lost about Z\$7 million per week in export earnings.
2. Zimbabwe continued to alter transport routes especially through Maputo and by the end of 1981 almost 40% of general trade was passing through Mozambique.
3. The rehabilitation of the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline (easily capable of handling most of Zimbabwe's petroleum requirements) was speeded up though never put into operation because Mozambique and Zimbabwe could not agree on the tariff.
4. Zimbabwe purchased more diesel engines from the U.S. and Canada and received management help from India.
5. Finally, in early 1982 Zimbabwe toned down its anti-South Africa rhetoric and initiated talks to reopen trade and transportation negotiations. South Africa conceded to renew the loan of locomotives, move fuel deliveries more expeditiously and abandoned the requirement for ministerial talks on railroad negotiations and the Preferential Trade Agreement.
6. This case also exhibits the ease with which routine business matters can be elevated to the level of political crisis by the actor nation.

This action was essentially effective because South Africa dominated Zimbabwe's external trade routes, the Mozambican ports and railroads still being relatively new and suffering from a four year lack of use and a worsening national economy that could not afford the required maintenance. Continued civil war activity within the

country, some of which is believed to have been directed by South Africa, also destroyed transport and communication facilities. Restricting the use of locomotives was particularly harmful due to Zimbabwe's rapidly expanding foreign trade at this time. Also of note is the fact that though the Beira route was open and only half as far as the South African ports, due to its steep gradient (1:40) it required two locomotives to haul the same load as to other outlets. [Ref. 53: p. 45]

6. Others

As mentioned earlier often times transport itself can be the target as well as the means of creating negative influence on another nation. By this is meant the actual destruction or disabling of a country's transport network. In the guerilla wars of Southern Africa this principally takes the form of mining or destroying key rail and road ways or bridges. This has been, and is being, done by both guerilla groups and national military forces. Its effectiveness varies with the degree of damage done, the importance of the line destroyed and most importantly, the ability of the target country to repair the damage or re-route traffic. See Table VIII below.

TABLE VIII

Actions of Negative Influence

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>BY WHOM</u>	<u>REFER.</u>
Easter 76	Mined rail line vicinity Beit Bridge	"Guerillas"	S. A.in Crisis
17 Dec 78	Sabotage rail line Cape to Transvaal	Mugabe ZANU	The Citizen 30 Dec 78
1978	Mugabe announce operate against Zambian-RSA rail	Mugabe	The Citizen 30 Dec 78
27 Oct 78	27 SAR wagons damaged on Zambia RR	Unknown	The Citizen 30 Dce 78
30 Oct 78	Landmine destroyed locomotive and track 35k from Lusaka	Unknown	The Citizen 30 Dcc 78
Early 79	Road, rail bridge destroyed; Moatize, Mozambique	Rhodesian Spec Forces	Pretoria News 25 June 79
22 Sep 83	Angolan goods train 70km from Lubango in SW Angola	SADF or UNITA	The Windhoek Advertiser 26 Sep 83
Aug 84	Sabotage and bombing of locomotives in northern Mozambique	MNR	Weekend Post 15 Sep 84

C. EXAMPLES OF THE NEUTRAL INFLUENCE OF TRANSPORT

1. Zambian Alternative Routing (See Table IX)

a. Background

Northern Rhodesia has had a historical dependence on its southern neighbors to move its exports to port. Despite the availability of the Benguela railroad and

routings through Zaire, Northern Rhodesia, later Zambia, was linked to Rhodesia Railways by contracts for a minimum percentage of her export traffic. The advent of independence provided an opportunity for new voices to be heard, and independent Zambia sought disengagement from the White south. Concomitantly, Zambia sought greater regional integration foreseeing for herself a central position in such an arrangement. UDI and the UN's call for sanctions against Rhodesia hastened Zambia's disengagement process.

Disengagement from a White south required either changing the White majority governments or finding alternative routes for trade. Zambia supported the former and, regardless of the nature of Rhodesian and South African governments, realized that it would be in her interest to pursue the latter. Kaunda sought to provide access to the ocean through politically sympathetic nations which are not hostile to the fundamental principles on which he bases the policies of Zambia. President Kaunda revived interest in the idea of a rail route to Dar Es Salaam and following the 1966 rail crisis renegotiated contracts with Zaire.

b. The Actions

The actions that Zambia pursued include:

1. Truck transport over the Great North Road to Dar Es Salaam. This was a 1200 mile dirt road (bitumenized by 1972) noted for poor trafficability in wet weather. It could handle 15,000 metric tons of traffic per month.

2. The Benguela railroad to Lobito, Angola. This route could carry 15,000 metric tons per month except when destroyed by guerillas in Angola or Zaire in 1968-69. and from 1977 to the present.
3. Truck transport on the Great East Road to Malawi and then by rail to Beira. This route takes four times as long as by road to Dar Es Salaam and is 20% more expensive. It could handle 4,000 metric tons per month.
4. Air transport to Dar Es Salaam or via rail and barge to Mombasa and other ports. These alternatives were used sparingly and never taken seriously as long term alternatives due to their exorbitant cost.

c. Objectives

The primary objective was to reduce economic ties to White Southern Africa by reducing trade and infrastructural linkages. This was principally directed at Rhodesia in accordance with the UN economic sanctions. A secondary objective, though in long run perhaps more important, was the creation of new routes as a means of diversifying the nation's alternatives and thus reducing a country's reliance on any one route.

d. Effects

Due to monthly copper production of 60,000 metric tons and the low capacity of alternative routes, Rhodesia Railways were still able to carry 20,000 metric tons per month until the 1973 border closure. In the early 1970's they were able to demand a minimum level of traffic from Zambia or force a 50% surcharge on Zambian imports.

[Ref. 45: pp. 160-162] Consequently, until the option was removed, Zambia's efforts to utilize alternative trade routes were unsuccessful, not due to a lack of effort or resolve but but because of the lack of development of sufficient alternative routes and the instability of other regimes. Ironically, as Zambia reduced her trade with Rhodesia her imports from South Africa increased, doubling between 1964-1974. This was a direct result of the loss of her principal trading partner and a growing demand for capital and consumer goods.

D. A CONSTELLATION OF TRANSPORT ORGANIZATIONS?

Though the South African government's Constellation of States, as applies to Southern Africa as a whole, has not come achieved its designers' expectations, a constellation of transportation organizations is alive and well and continuing to flourish. This section is not intended to be an argument for regional co-operation but is designed to present a possible framework by which one may better understand or view the inter-relationship of transport organizations in Southern Africa and the role transport diplomacy plays in keeping them together. Rather than "constellation", the term "association" will be used to label the idea of a regional transportation grouping, and to avoid the negative connotation that "constellation" may have picked up in the Southern African context.

Though some transport organizations in Southern Africa are joined in formal organizations (eg. Inter-state Transport Liaison Committee of South Africa's Constellation of States, the South Africa Custom Union and SADCC's Southern Africa Transport and Communications Committee) most are linked by shared rail lines and business agreements regulating the cost and use of one another's rail lines, equipment and facilities. They all are unified in a professional sense of purpose of moving freight and passengers as efficiently and economically as possible.

The basis for identifying a regional transportation network extends to the early days of the railroads when they first crossed colonial or international borders. As has been elaborated on in the first chapter of this paper, the early years were marked by intense competition between railroads and their governments. Later, cooperation became the byword as the rail lines divided traffic among themselves and worked together throughout the 20th century. Independence in the 1960's was accompanied by nationalistic protection of the transport services as the new nations sought economic independence and sources of revenue to meet the expenses of social reforms. Accompanied by the distancing of Black and White ruled nations there was a falling off of intra-organizational relations in the 1960's as indicated by border closures and a lack of technical conferences as compared to the pre-independence period.

Outward movement, personal interest and diplomacy on the part of individuals such as Loubser and then the era of detente ushered in a closer association of transport organizations. The political reasons and undertones of this process have been described previously, thus this section will identify characteristics of a transport association in Southern Africa and what it may mean for the region's future.

The concept 'association' refers to a general psychological principle and relates to the process by which individuals or groups become linked to one another and the resultant groupings. "The concept association sometimes merely implies the casual juxtaposition of units, but some degree of organization, however rudimentary or transient seems imperative...the purpose of an association undergoes change...but it must be remembered...that the units may join a particular association for quite different and even conflicting motives." [Ref. 30: p. 40]

Membership in a transport association is open to all transport organizations in the region due to their common interests and the interchangeability of equipment (ie. rolling stock from any country can be found on virtually any other country's rail line. Peripheral countries (eg. Tanzania) can afford to occasionally exclude themselves due to their lack of direct lines to South Africa, all others cannot afford to do so and thus politics is no longer

a consideration for membership. Due to its preponderance of equipment, facilities and services South Africa is able to be a more important member of this association. However, due to its diplomatic isolation maintenance of these lines of communications is important for South Africa and may temper any domination that it may seek.

The rationale for membership in such an association is the transportation organization's self interest in the generation of revenue. This objective is supported by each government due to the key position trade holds in their economies, and the parastatal nature of virtually every railway in the region. Political considerations (ie. anti-apartheid stance) has formed the basis of membership in the SADCC by Southern African nations other than South Africa. However, even in SADCC economic considerations are paramount given that the aim is to reduce dependence on South Africa's transport and a change of politics in South Africa will not alter this primary goal. "This objective,...., includes reducing dependence on overseas countries as well as avoiding the trap of excessive dependence on individual countries, such as Zimbabwe, which has a relatively sophisticated economy." [Ref. 55]

To fully fit the definition of an association the grouping requires some degree of organization however rudimentary or transitory. What form does this organization take in Southern Africa?

The most highly organized grouping of regional transport is found in the SADCC's Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC). Though this is formalized, it fails to include and seeks to ignore the dominant transport system, SATS. A more complete but less organized grouping is the informal association between transport organizations of all the countries to include the Republic of South Africa. These are linked to one another via business and trade agreements that define, regulate and set charges for the use of each others assets. These agreements have existed for over 80 years and have periodically been updated to conform to changing circumstances or interests of the parties. Some have even been formalized via international treaty or convention such as the South Africa-Mozambique convention. An association also exists by virtue of the technical conferences which have been held at regular intervals throughout the 1940's, 50's and since the mid-1970's. When one considers the lack of formal relations and the outspoken anti-South Africa rhetoric of so many of the participating nations these conferences are the scene of a remarkably free flow of information and offers of assistance all with at least the aim of efficient and unobstructed flow of commerce.

One interpretation of South Africa's Constellation of States is that it is an attempt to seek regional solutions to regional problems [Ref. 30: p. 53]. This is also a

useful interpretation of the idea of a transport association in Southern Africa. A major theme of Loubser's public and private statements on transport diplomacy and development in Southern Africa is that South Africa has the means, expertise and willingness to aid its neighbors in the resolution of their (collective) problems. This does not mean to imply that South Africa has all the answers for regional transportation, but only that it has a great deal of resources and the professed willingness to work cooperatively with its neighboring transport organizations. Public examples of this are most readily viewed in the transcripts of the technical conferences. Though not in the public domain the inter-organizational business agreements also clearly display this cooperative interchange.

By means of this cooperation, SATS is able, through the association of transport organizations, to complement the government's objectives of a constellation of states-peace, stability, order, development and prosperity. Work among transport organizations also creates common interests and these may act as a moderating influence on the national leaders.

Geldenuys and Venter examine the viability of the constellation of states using the four variables of cohesion, communication, level of power and structure of relations. They find that economic cohesion, as opposed to social, political and organizational, is the sole positive

cohesive force in the region and that the others militate against it. For similar reasons they found that regional relations are stuck at the level of limited cooperation in non-political fields and South Africa's overwhelming power is an inhibitor to closer relations. Communication is the only variable in which there is a modicum of normality in the region, and transport is the major means of communication in Southern Africa. The other means (tourism, labour, mass media) are indirect, along racial lines or one-way and therefore ineffective. Transportation on the other hand transcends these difficulties and despite efforts to lessen contacts with South Africa, remains as the only open and continuous channel of communications. It is maintained that way due to the common interest of the parties involved.

The future of any transportation association in Southern Africa rests on this idea of common interests regardless of the politics of the member states. This is unlike political groupings that are so dependent on South Africa's domestic social and political structures for much of their *raison d'etre*. All transportation organizations in Southern Africa will remain in an associational grouping until the SADCC countries are able to free themselves of dependence on SATS. This will not happen in the foreseeable future due to the structural inefficiencies that exist in the region and the lack of port facilities for the landlocked countries.

Active destabilization of neighboring states is not necessary for South Africa to maintain traffic on its rail lines. Only with internal stability will Mozambique's and Angola's railways begin to reach their potential capacities. And all rail systems of Southern Africa require constant and diligent maintenance. The unaided expertise for this is at least ten years away, the interim period will be filled by SATS personnel or under their supervision. Ultimately, dissolution of a transport association will lay in the capability of non-South African ports for only through them can reliance on South Africa's rail and road network be avoided for the conduct of external trade. Even at the stage when transport networks operate at capacity and ports are able to handle their required loads, intra-regional trade shall be such (as it is now) that total and complete severance from South Africa will not likely take place.

Consequently, transportation is now and shall be for the future a means for regional cooperation, organization and communication.

TABLE IX

Alternative Routes for Zambian Access to the Sea

<u>Port</u>	<u>Importance</u>	<u>Date est.</u>	<u>Route</u>	<u>Dist. (km)</u>	<u>Type</u>
<u>Mozambique</u>					
1. Beira	Major	1909	Ndola-Bulawayo-Harare-Beira	2360	rail
2. Beira	Secondary	1954	Ndola-Chirundu-Harare-Beira	1350	road
3. Beira	Minor		Lusaka-Chipata-Beira	2050	road
4. Maputo	Secondary	1955	Ndola-Bulawayo-L-M	2330	rail
5. Maputo	Secondary	1954	Ndola-Harare-Beitbridge-L-M	2160	road
6. Nacala	Secondary	1970	Ndola-Chipata-Salima-Nacala	2030	road
<u>South Africa</u>					
7. Durban	Secondary	1954	Ndola-Bulawayo-Mafeking	3130	rail
8. Durban	Secondary	1954	Ndola-Chirundu-Harare-	2520	road
<u>Angola</u>					
9. Lobito	Major	1931	Ndola-Lubumbashi-Lobito	2375	rail
10. Lobito	Proposed	----	Ndola-Chingola-Lobito	2300	rail

TABLE IX

Alternative Routes for Zambian Access to the Sea (cont'd.)

<u>Zaire</u>	Secondary	1928	Ndola-Lubumbashi-Kinshasa	3050	rail
11. Matadi					
<u>Tanzania</u>					
12. Dar	Major		Ndola-Kapiri Mposhi-Dar	1940	road
13. Dar	Projected	1976	Ndola-Kapiri Mposhi-Dar	1976	TAZARA
14. Dar	Major		Ndola-Tunduma-Dar Es Salaam	1700	pipeline
<u>Kenya</u>					
15. Mombasa	Minor	----	Ndola-Kapiri Mposhi-Mombasa	2200	road

Note: This is not a complete listing all routes for Zambian external trade. Routes 1 through 8 were closed as a result of the Rhodesian border closure.

Source: [Ref. 56: p. 122]

TABLE X

Distribution of Zambian External Trade by Route

Value of Imports (including government stores) Millions of Pounds

<u>Route</u>	<u>1931</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1946</u>
South Africa	1.9 (35%)	.72 (24%)	1.3 (25%)	2.5 (35%)	2.7 (33%)
S. Rhodesia	3.5 (65%)	2.3 (76%)	3.9 (75%)	4.5 (65%)	5.5 (67%)
Total Value	5.4	3.02	5.2	7.0	8.2

Sources: Northern Rhodesia Annual Report of the Customs Department, and Statement of the Trade of Northern Rhodesia. Government Printer, Lusaka.

TABLE XI

Distribution of Zambian Import Trade by Route

(Imports-percent of total tonnage)

Route & Method of Transport	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
<u>By Road:</u>								
Tanzania	19.2%	11.4%	12.3%	14.4%	12.3%	15.8%	20.8%	30.2%
Rhodesia	17.1	3.3	3.5	10.6	8.3	0.7	---	---
South Africa	1.5	1.5	---	---	---	---	---	---
Malawi	2.8	2.7	.9	1.4	2.3	9.4	9.2	9.2
Other	0.3	--	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.0	1.9	3.2
Total by Road	40.9%	18.9%	16.8%	26.5%	22.9%	26.9%	31.9	44.3%
<u>By Rail</u>								
Congo/Zaire	6.8	5.8	5.8	13.1	8.4	17.2	28.3	15.3
Rhodesia-Moz	33.7	44.2	60.5	40.6	41.4	6.8	--	--
South Africa	18.1	15.0	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
Total by Rail	58.6%	65.0%	66.3%	53.7%	49.8%	24.0%	28.3%	15.3%

Note: The remainder of traffic was carried by pipeline.

Source: Northern Rhodesia Annual Report of the Customs Department. and Statement of the Trade of Northern Rhodesia (beginning 1948). Government printer, Lusaka.

TABLE XII

Distribution of Zambian Import Trade by Route, continued

(measured as a percentage of total tonnage)

Route & Method of Transport	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
<u>By Road</u>						
Tanzania	15.4%	12.2%	19.3%	19.7%	N/A	N/A
Malawi	10.1	2.2	11.9	6.9	N/A	N/A
Others	1.0	4.0	5.2	3.2	N/A	N/A
Total by Road	26.4%	18.4%	36.4%	29.8%	N/A	N/A
<u>By Rail</u>						
Tanzania	17.7	29.8	12.6	22.0	N/A	N/A
Zaire	1.4	--	--	--	--	--
Others	--	--	0.7	17.7	--	--
Total by Rail	19.1%	29.8%	13.3%	39.7%	--	--

Source: Annual Statement of External Trade, volume I, Imports and Exports and Re-exports. Central Statistical Office, Lusaka, 1974-1979.

TABLE XIII

Distribution of Zambian Export Trade by Route

(measured as percentage of total tonnage)

Route & Method of Transport	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
<u>By Road</u>								
Tanzania	27.5%	28.1%	29.9%	28.7%	24.6%	41.2%	46.8%	52.4%
Rhodesia	nil	nil	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1	nil	nil
South Africa	0.3	0.2	---	---	---	---	---	---
Malawi	1.1	0.9	0.7	1.1	0.8	2.7	3.4	14.7
Other	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.2	1.4	2.0	2.4
Total Road	29.1	92.4	31.4	30.3	25.7	45.4	52.2	69.5
<u>By Rail</u>								
Zaire-Lobito	23.7	14.2	22.1	19.3	19.7	49.0	47.8	30.5
Rhodesia	41.5	52.8	46.5	50.4	54.6	5.3	---	---
South Africa	5.6	3.5	---	---	---	---	---	---
Total by Rail	70.8	70.5	68.6	69.7	74.3	54.3	47.8	30.5

Source: Same as Table XIV.

TABLE XIV

Distribution of Zambian Export Trade by Route, continued

<u>Route & Method</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
<u>By Road</u>				
Tanzania	41.2	13.2	10.1	21.4
Malawi	11.5	6.4	3.1	2.1
Other	1.5	4.8	6.2	5.9
Total by Road	54.3	24.4	19.4	29.4
<u>By Rail</u>				
Tanzania	39.9	69.4	73.2	30.1
Zaire	5.7	5.3	3.9	6.9
Other	--	--	--	--
Total by Rail	45.7	74.7	798.9	69.5

Source: Republic of Zambia Annual Statement of External Trade, volume I, Imports, Exports and Re-exports. Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

In Southern Africa it has proven impossible to separate economic and technological considerations from political considerations. Despite leading actors' declarations about the non-political nature of transportation, when it is made an integral part of a government's organization and is essential to a state's livelihood (particularly for states that earn a good portion of their Gross National Product via foreign trade) transport becomes political. This is apparent to varying degrees depending on the degree of subtlety of its use. Because of this inherent politicization of transport, any use of transport as a punishment has a destabilizing effect.

'Transport diplomacy', the term itself accentuates the political nature of transportation, is the way in which South Africa utilized its transport assets and organization to effect positive political influence with its neighbors. It can be regarded as the art of enabling the transport potential of a country to play a maximum role in that country's relations with other countries, for the furtherance of its own as well as the common interests. [Ref. 34: p. 5] This is partially founded on the belief that stable interstate relations are preferred and mutually beneficial, and that economic ties (trade, transport,

communications and assistance) can transcend political differences and strengthen a positive relationship. The case studies in this paper do not seem to bear this out. However, the opposite, that economic ties lead to interstate disintegration, is not supported either. Apparently, the best one can hope for is that there may be economic benefits for both parties and political benefits if they want them.

Another facet of relations shown by these cases is that situations of structural dependence are not entirely intractable, nor are the constraints imposed by the interdependence of Southern Africa confined to the landlocked states. This has been illustrated by Zambia's ability to, for at least five years, disengage itself from Rhodesia following the latter's border closure. State's bordering the seas may find themselves dependent on their landlocked neighbors, not the other way a round, if a key revenue earner is transport and it is dependent on transit traffic for a large share of its revenue.

Consequently, "dominant governments do not enjoy an unlimited facility to achieve foreign policy objectives." [Ref. 57: p. 324] Disengagement can probably be affected relatively quickly in the political and military spheres but not in the economic sphere. The issue for the longer term is whether prevailing economic structures will undermine a drive for political autonomy, or whether political

initiatives can insert the thin edge of the wedge of eventual structural change in the economic sphere. The first task is simply to distinguish the alterable relationships from those that are more enduring. [Ref. 57: p. 324] All of this leads one to retreat from the extreme position that economic dependence constrains policy choice.

Sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power to actors. If one actor can reduce its costs by altering its policies, either domestically or internationally, the sensitivity patterns will not be a good guide to power resources. [Ref. 58: p. 15]

This is clearly displayed by the two cases of interaction between Zambia and Rhodesia in 1966 and 1973. In both cases Rhodesia enjoyed a favorable asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence vis-a-vis Zambia. The difference was that in 1973 Zambia was able, and did, alter her domestic and international policies, particularly in utilizing alternative trade routes.

Economic relations and dependence can be severed immediately but only at great cost. Dependence in the transport field can be altered, but only if done slowly and at only relatively less expense. However, once accomplished it may be longer lasting than political relationships. The problem to overcome is that structural relationships die hard, but once broken are severed more permanently.

APPENDIX A

DEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE AND VULNERABILITY

Prior to examining case studies involving the use of transportation as an element of foreign policy, it is necessary to examine briefly the ideas of dependence or reliance and interdependence of states on their neighbors in the field of transport, especially rail lines and ports.

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye in their book Power and Interdependence address the issue of dependence defining it as "a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces" [Ref. 58: p. 8] and identify two key dimensions, sensitivity and vulnerability. Interdependence is defined as mutual dependence and differs from simple relations, or 'interconnectedness', in that the interactions involved have reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects. Such interdependence will always involve costs since, by definition, it restricts the actors' autonomy. [Ref. 58: pp. 12-13]

Sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation.

Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework - how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects? It is measured not merely by the volume of flows across borders but also by the costly effects

of changes in transactions on the societies or governments. [Ref. 58: p. 12]

Vulnerability, on the other hand, refers to a nation's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered. "Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time." [Ref. 58: p. 13]

Here, the primary issue is the way in which interdependence, vulnerability or sensitivity affect inter-state relationships. Keohane and Nye state that "asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power" when one thinks of "power as control over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes." [Ref. 58: p. 11] However, this advantage does not guarantee control over the outcome of its use as a political tool.

Vulnerability is particularly important for understanding the political structure of interdependence relationships....Vulnerability is clearly more relevant than sensitivity. for example, in analyzing the politics of raw materials...a high percentage of imports of material is taken as an index of vulnerability, when by itself it merely suggests that sensitivity is high." [Ref. 58: p. 15]

This is precisely what will be seen to have happened in some of the following case studies in which an attempt to manipulate asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence without regard for underlying patterns of vulnerability were undertaken.

Keohane and Nye also caution that "a measure of potential power such as asymmetrical interdependence" is not able to infallibly predict actors' successes or failures at influencing outcomes. It merely provides a first approximation of initial bargaining advantages available to either side." [Ref. 58: p. 19] This is of particular concern in Southern Africa where a common belief holds that there has been/is a high level of vulnerability on the part of Southern African states on the transport network of South Africa (and formerly Rhodesia).

APPENDIX B

TONNAGES RAILED TO AND RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN RAILWAYS BY SATS

(000 tons)

Year	Forwarded to		Received From		Total Traffic on all SAR Lines
	Rhodesia Rlwys	CFM	Tot. Rhodesia	CFM Total	
40-41	228	1081	121	672	793
45-46	245	3129	206	514	720
50-51	756	2705	288	1089	1376
55-56	770	1243	388	1341	1729
60-61	662	2267	263	1342	1605
63-63	614	2524	332	1340	1672
64-65					N/A
70-71					47,570
75-76					61,482
83-84					74,583
					88,029
					99,218
					104,408
					120,802
					130,141
					157,237

DATA NO LONGER GIVEN IN SAR&H ANNUAL REPORT

Source: South African Railways and Harbours Administration, Annual Report of the General Manager. Pretoria, The Government Printer.

APPENDIX C

SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

(Millions of Rand, Percent of Total Imports)

Country of Origin	1959	1960	1961	1963	1964	1965
Total Europe	--	--	557 (56%)	676	843 (55%)	970 (55%)
U.K.	303 (31%)	315 (28%)	291 (29%)	362	437 (28%)	495 (28%)
U.S.	167 (17)	215 (19)	177 (18)	204	292 (19)	331 (19)
Japan	31 (3)	41 (3.7)	38 (4)	56	81 (5)	100 (6)
Rhod/Nyas.	24 (2.4)	29 (2.6)	25 (2)	33	---	---
S.Rhodesia					22	
Malawi					1.6	
Zambia					20.3	
Angola	0.7 (.1)	0.5 (.05)		0.5	1.5	---
---						---
Mozambique	2.9 (.3)	3 (0.3)	2.3 (.2)	6.1	---	---
Total Africa			80	90 (6)	109 (6)	
Total Value	977	1,111	1,003	N/A	1,540	1,756

Country of Origin	<u>1967</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1983</u>
Total Europe	1054 (55)	1573 (55)	3271 (59)	----	7534 (41)	6754 (42)
U.K.	497 (26)	669 (23)	1094 (20)	1043 (17)	2160 (12)	1892 (12)
U.S.	322 (17)	469 (16)	984 (18)	987 (16)	2652 (14)	2467 (15)
Japan	116 (6)	292 (10)	612 (11)	824 (13)	1962 (11)	1908 (12)
Total Africa	141 (7)	127 (4)	253 (5)	246 (4)	318 (2)	325 (2)
Total Value	1,919	2,887	5,561	6,253	18,483	16,253

Source: South African Trade Statistics, volume I, Imports and Exports. Compiled by the Department of Customs and Excise. Printed by the Government Printer, Pretoria.

APPENDIX D

SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS (INCL RE-EXPORTS FOR 1959-64)

(incl. re-exports for the years 1959-1964, percentages in parentheses)

Destination Country	1959	1960	1961	1963	1964	1965
Tot. Europe	--	--	452 (53)	509 (56)	531 (56)	622 (59)
U.K.	258 (33)	265 (33)	254 (30)	329 (36)	341 (36)	357 (34)
U.S.	71 (9)	54 (7)	62 (7)	81 (9)	82 (9)	99 (9)
Japan	---	---	---	71 (8)	84 (9)	76 (7)
Rhod/Nyasa.	121 (15)	122 (15)	109 (13)	86 (9)	---	---
S. Rhodesia					36 (4)	---
Zambia					54 (6)	---
Malawi					29 (3)	---
Mozambique	15 (2)	14 (2)	12 (1)	15 (2)	15 (2)	
Total Africa	---	---	---	107 (12)	126 (13)	147 (14)
Total Exports	790	799	850	916	955	1,060

Destination Country	<u>1967</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1983</u>
Tot. Europe	739 (54)	777 (50)	2161 (54)	3668 (50)	5094	5176
U.K.	421 (31)	419 (27)	928 (23)	1264 (17)	1117 (6)	1324 (6)
U.S.	107 (8)	121 (8)	435 (11)	1351 (18)	1521 (8)	1754 (8)
Japan	175 (13)	183 (12)	492 (12)	766 (10)	1416 (8)	1547 (7)
Total Africa	223 (16)	---	---	---	1035 (6)	797 (4)
Total Exports	1,365	1,569	3,990	7,333	18,251	20,672

Source: South African Foreign Trade Statistics, volume I, Imports and Exports
Compiled by the Department of Customs and Excise. Printed and Published by the
Government printer, Pretoria.

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